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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Nothing causes litigators greater anxiety than the possibility of
doing, or failing to do, something during a civil case that waives attorney–
client privilege or work-product protection.1 Attend any seminar, webcast,
podcast, or other continuing legal education course dealing with the
discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”) and you are sure to
hear about this concern and how to mitigate it.2 Listen to any discussion

*

Paul W. Grimm is the Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland; Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom and Matthew P.
Kraeuter are Judge Grimm’s law clerks. The views expressed in this article are those of
the authors alone and not the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
1

See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“[Rule 502] responds to the
widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of
attorney–client privilege or work product have become prohibitive due to the concern that
any disclosure (however innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver of
all protected communications or information.”).
2

See, e.g., J. Michael Rediker, E-mail and Document Production in Native Format, in
767 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, LITIGATION 195, 206-07 (2007) (discussing concerns over waiver of
privilege in e-discovery situations).
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or read any article or lawyer survey addressing concerns about the
escalating costs of pretrial discovery, particularly in cases where ESI
discovery is expected to be prominent, and you also will hear that one of
the greatest costs of discovery is the pre-production review of ESI
designed to ensure that privileged or protected information is not
disclosed.3
[2]
The enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (“Rule 502”) in
2008 was intended to provide a vehicle to reduce the anxiety and costs
associated with privilege review, but to date it has not lived up to its
promise.4 The explanation for why Rule 502 has fallen short may have to
do with the reality that a disappointingly small number of lawyers seem to
be aware of the rule and its potential, despite the fact that the rule is over
two years old.5 Also, courts have not interpreted Rule 502 with sufficient
consistency in reported decisions to enable practitioners and their clients
to predict how they will fare if they attempt to take advantage of the rule
to reduce the need for manual, document-by-document pre-production
review by either employing electronic search and retrieval methodologies
or entering into time and money saving non-waiver agreements.6
[3]
This Article will address the twin impediments to a fuller adoption
of Rule 502 from the perspective of a trial judge who often is involved
with regulating the discovery process in civil cases. This Article also
provides the perspective of one who is particularly familiar with the goals
that underlie the enactment of Rule 502, having authored one of the cases
that discussed the then-existing state of the law on the eve of the adoption

3

See, e.g., Clayton L. Barker & Philip W. Goodin, Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information, 64 J. MO. B. 12, 18 (2008) (discussing the “staggering” costs associated
with pre-production review of ESI for privileged information).
4

See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

5

See, e.g., Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 427 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting that, one year
after the enactment of Rule 502, lawyers failed to cite Rule 502 even though it controlled
their motion).
6

See discussion infra Part IV.C.

2
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of the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
addressed the discovery of ESI and, in that case, expressed concern that
the 2006 amendments did not contain sufficient protections against waiver
of privilege or protection to promote the aspirations of the new rules.7 To
undertake this analysis, the Article will focus on Rule 502 itself, section
by section, with particular emphasis on the Advisory Committee’s Note,
and it will discuss the cases that have, to date, interpreted each section of
the rule. Additionally, the Article will provide suggestions for interpreting
and applying Rule 502 so that the rule effectively serves as a roadmap for
avoiding or limiting the effect of disclosure of privileged or work-product
protected information and any ensuing waiver.
II. OVERVIEW
[4]
Rule 502 is titled “Attorney–Client Privilege and Work Product;
Limitations on Waiver.”8 As the title makes clear, the rule applies only to
the attorney–client privilege and the work product doctrine.9 It has no
effect on any other evidentiary privilege, such as the vast array of
governmental, or other common law privileges, including the confidential
marital communications privilege,10 the psychotherapist–patient
privilege,11 the clergy–communicant privilege,12 the “law enforcement” or

7

See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005); discussion infra Part
II.A.
8

FED. R. EVID. 502.

9

See FED. R. EVID. 502. The differences between the attorney–client privilege and the
work product doctrine are discussed infra Part II.B.
10

See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (noting that there is an
“independent rule protecting confidential marital communications”).
11

See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (noting that Rule 501 protects
psychotherapist-patient communications).
12

See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 8 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (describing the test for
determining whether a communication with a clergyman is privileged).

3
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“informer’s” privilege,13 and the “deliberative process” privilege.14 In
addition, Rule 502 only applies to certain types of waiver of the attorney–
client privilege or work-product protection, namely those made by an
actual disclosure of the privileged or protected information.15 Further,
Rule 502 addresses how a party can waive, or not waive, the attorney–
client privilege or work-product protection when making disclosures either
in a “federal proceeding” or to a “federal agency.”16 Thus, the rule reaches
disclosures made during civil and criminal proceedings in federal court,
during administrative proceedings, and to federal administrative agencies
during investigative proceedings.
A. Legislative History
[5]
Prior to, and foreshadowing, the enactment of Rule 502, in Hopson
v. Mayor of Baltimore, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland recognized that the policy of “narrowly confining the attorneyclient privilege to its essential purpose, with subject-matter waiver as the
price for unprotected disclosure” was at odds with “the distinct trend
towards limiting the nature and amount of discovery to the needs of the
particular case, given the issues in the case, the importance of the facts
sought to be discovered, and the resources of the parties.”17 The court
further acknowledged “the enormous costs that would accompany a
requirement that in all civil cases the production of electronically stored
information could not be accomplished until after a comprehensive

13

See In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 2010) (considering the
question of when the “‘law enforcement privilege’ must yield to the needs of a party
seeking discovery in a civil action”).
14

See Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001)
(mentioning the “deliberative process” privilege as a civil discovery privilege).
15

See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“[Rule 502] governs only certain
waivers by disclosure. Other common-law waiver doctrines may result in a finding of
waiver even where there is no disclosure of privileged information or work product.”).
16

See FED. R. EVID. 502.

17

See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 238 (D. Md. 2005).

4
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privilege review and particularized assertion of privilege and work product
claims,” and noted that ESI production costs could amount to millions of
dollars, including tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in privilege
review costs.18 Additionally, the court observed that, “[w]ith regard to the
process of assembling electronic information responsive to discovery
requests, an entire industry of consultants ha[d] developed to provide
services to litigants,” with one consultant estimating “‘2004 domestic
commercial electronic discovery revenues were in the range of $832
million - a 94 percent increase from 2003,’” and projecting revenues of
$1.282 billion for 2005, $1.923 billion for 2006, and $2.865 billion for
2007.19
[6]
With such exorbitant costs, “insist[ing] in every case upon ‘old
world’ record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of
subject matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that
bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the litigation.”20 The court,
quoting the Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States by the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, noted:
The problems that can result from efforts to guard against
privilege waiver often become more acute when discovery
of electronically stored information is sought. The volume
of the information and the forms in which it is stored make
privilege determinations more difficult and privilege review
correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming, yet
less likely to detect all privileged information. Inadvertent
production is increasingly likely to occur.21
18

See id.

19

Id. at 239 & n.32 (citing Socha-Gelbmann 2005 Electronic Discovery Survey, SOCHA
CONSULTING LLC, http://www.sochaconsulting.com/2005surveyresults.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011)).
20

Id. at 244.

21

Id. at 232 (quoting COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 27 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE]).

5
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Notably, pre-Rule 502 inadvertent production of privileged data could
“constitute a waiver of privilege as to a particular item of information,
items related to the relevant issue, or the entire data collection” in some
jurisdictions.22
[7]
Thus, significant discovery issues existed, including: the privilege
review a party producing ESI had to perform; whether counsel could enter
into non-waiver agreements to permit post-production assertion of
privilege; whether such agreements would be effective; and whether,
under principles of substantive evidence law, inadvertent production
resulted in waiver of privilege.23 Addressing these issues in Hopson, the
court observed that “one of the most challenging aspects” of ESI
discovery is “how properly to conduct Rule 34 discovery within a
reasonable pretrial schedule, while concomitantly insuring that requesting
parties receive appropriate discovery, and that producing parties are not
subjected to production timetables that create unreasonable burden,
expense, and risk of waiver of attorney–client privilege and work product
protection.”24
[8]
To address these challenges, pending amendments to Rules 16(b)
and 26(f)25 “encourage[d] the party receiving the electronic discovery to
agree not to assert waiver of privilege/work product protection against an
opposing party that agrees to provide expedited production of
electronically stored information without first doing a full-fledged
privilege review.”26 Specifically, the amendments authorized the court to
issue scheduling orders to address non-waiver agreements between the
parties, permitted the parties to ask the court to adopt their agreements,
22

Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 232.

23

Id. at 231.

24

Id. at 232.

25

See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, at XII (Comm. Print 2009) (noting that the 2006 amendments went into
effect on December 1, 2006).
26

Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 234.

6
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and permitted the parties to make post-production claims of privilege and
work-product protection for ESI.27 However, as the court pointed out, the
Report of the Judicial Conference noted that the proposed amendments
only allowed for a party to claim privilege or work-product protection: it
did not state definitively that producing documents pursuant to non-waiver
agreements would not result in waiver of privilege or work-product
protection.28 Thus, the amendments would permit parties to reduce “the
burdens of privilege review” for ESI, “but at the price of risking waiver or
forfeiture of privilege/work product protection, depending on the
substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the litigation was pending,”
such that “no prudent party would agree to follow the procedures
recommended in the proposed rule.”29
[9]
Nonetheless, “parties, with the apparent encouragement of courts,
ha[d] been using these procedures even in advance of the adoption of rule
changes authorizing them.”30 Parties were “‘enter[ing] into agreements to
disclose privileged materials provided the disclosure [was] not taken to
entail waiver as to all privileged matters,’” and courts were upholding the
agreements—or even adopting them as court orders—so that the parties, in
theory, could “‘avoid the general rule that partial disclosure on a given
subject matter [would] bring in its wake total disclosure.’”31 The
agreements “‘protect[ed] responding parties from the most dire
consequences of inadvertent waiver by allowing them to “take back”
inadvertently produced privileged materials if discovered within a
reasonable period, perhaps thirty days from production.’”32

27

Id. at 233 (citing REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 21, at 26, 52).

28

Id. (citing REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 21, at 26).

29

Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 233–34 (footnote omitted).

30

Id. at 234, 235 n.10 (collecting cases from 1950 through 2003 and noting that “[n]ot all
courts have approved non-waiver agreements between counsel”).
31

Id. at 232 n.1 (quoting EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 287–88 (4th ed. 2001)).
32

PRIVILEGE AND

Id. at 232 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004)).
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[10] But, prior to Rule 502, these non-waiver agreements would not
necessarily “insulate the parties from waiver” or be enforceable as to third
parties.33 In part, their effectiveness depended on the court hearing a
waiver argument, because the federal courts took “three distinct positions”
as to whether inadvertent production waived privilege or work-product
protection:
The “strict accountability” approach followed by the
Federal Circuit and the First Circuit [and the District of
Columbia] (which almost always finds waiver, even if
production was inadvertent, because “once confidentiality
is lost, it can never be restored”); the lenient/ “to err is
human” approach, followed by the Eighth Circuit and a
handful of district courts (which views waiver as requiring
intentional and knowing relinquishment of the privilege,
and finds waiver in circumstances of inadvertent disclosure
only if caused by gross negligence); and the third approach,
adopting a “ ‘balancing’ test that requires the court to make
a case-by-case determination of whether the conduct is
excusable so that it does not entail a necessary waiver”
[(adopted by a number of district courts within the Fourth
Circuit)].34
Considering these disparate views, the Hopson court cautioned that parties
should “assume that complete pre-production privilege review is required,
unless it can be demonstrated with particularity that it would be unduly
burdensome or expensive to do so.”35
[11] The Hopson court presented a “viable method of dealing with the
practical challenges to privilege review of electronically stored
information without running an unacceptable risk of subject-matter
33

Id. at 235 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE § 55077, 579 n.22 (1986)).
34

Id. at 235–36 (footnotes omitted).

35

Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 244.

8
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waiver.”36 Explaining that parties can avoid waiver successfully if “the
production of inadvertently produced privileged electronic data [is] at the
compulsion of the court, rather than solely by the voluntary act of the
producing party,” and “the procedures agreed to by the parties and ordered
by the court demonstrate that reasonable measures were taken to protect
against waiver of privilege and work product protection,”37 the court
proposed that courts issue protective orders, scheduling orders, or
discovery management orders “that incorporate procedures under which
electronic records will be produced without waiving privilege or work
product that the courts have determined to be reasonable given the nature
of the case, and that have been agreed to by the parties.”38 It elaborated:
[P]arties that have entered into an agreement to preserve
privilege claims with respect to production of electronically
stored information [may] avoid subsequent claims by third
parties that the production waived the privilege, provided:
(a) the party claiming the privilege took reasonable steps
given the volume of electronically stored data to be
reviewed, the time permitted in the scheduling order to do
so, and the resources of the producing party; (b) the
producing party took reasonable steps to assert promptly
the privilege once it learned that some privileged
information inadvertently had been disclosed, despite the
exercise of reasonable measures to screen for privilege and,
importantly; (c) the production had been compelled by
court order that was issued after the court's independent
evaluation of the scope of electronic discovery permitted,
the reasonableness of the procedures the producing party
took to screen out privileged material or assert postproduction claims upon discovery of inadvertent production
of privileged information, and the amount of time that the
court allowed the producing party to spend on the
36

Id. at 239.

37

Id. at 240.

38

Id. at 239.

9
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production.39
Thus, the permitted amount of ESI discovery would “be a function of the
issues in the litigation, the resources of the parties, whether the discovery
sought [was] available from alternative sources that [we]re less
burdensome, and the importance of the evidence sought to be discovered
by the requesting party to its ability to prove its claims.”40
[12] In its proposal, the court relied on Proposed Rule of Evidence 512,
which, while rejected by Congress, nonetheless “evidence[s] the common
law of privilege and therefore may be applied under Rule 501 if reason
and experience make such application appropriate.”41 Proposed Rule 512
provides: “Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter
is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was
(a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the
privilege.”42 Thus, Proposed Rule 512 “can contain” damage caused by
the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information.43 Courts have relied
on Proposed Rule 512 “to hold that a party that is compelled to produce
privileged material, or erroneously produces it, does not waive the
privilege.”44 Simply put, “provided the holder of the privilege has taken
all reasonable measures under the circumstances to prevent disclosure, but
was prevented from doing so by matters beyond his control, a finding of
waiver would be unfair and improper.”45 While the mechanism to avoid

39

Id. at 242.

40

Id. at 244.

41

Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 240 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 512.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender
2d ed. 1997)).
42

Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 259 (1972) (Federal
Rule of Evidence 512).
43

Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 241.

44

Id. (citing Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 575 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978)).

45

Id. at 243.
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privilege waiver that Hopson suggested was a means to avoid the harsh
effects of waiver, it was nonetheless a Rube Goldberg machine46 that was
both cumbersome and limited. Essentially, it required the court to burden
the parties with compulsion to conduct discovery in a manner that would
enhance the risk of unintentional disclosure of privileged or protected
information.
[13] Two years after the Hopson decision, in September 2007, when the
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
approved Proposed Rule 502 and the Judicial Conference recommended
its enactment, the Committee submitted the proposed rule to Congress.47
The Committee submitted the proposed rule to Congress because, while
the Rules Enabling Act provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of
evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals,”48 it
also provides that “[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act
of Congress.”49 On February 25, 2008, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
reported the legislation out of the Committee on the Judiciary without
amendment.50 By unanimous vote and without amendment, the Senate
approved the legislation on February 27, 2008.51 The legislation passed
the House on September 8, 2008 with an addition to the explanatory note

46

See
generally
Rube
Goldberg
Biography,
RUBE
GOLDBERG,
http://www.rubegoldberg.com/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (“A Rube Goldberg
contraption . . . takes a simple task and makes it extraordinarily complicated.”).
47

Bill Summary and Status, 110th Congress (2007 – 2008) S.2450, All Congressional
Actions,
LIBR.
CONGRESS,
http://Thomas.loc.gov./cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:
SN02450:@@@X (last visited Feb. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Bill Summary and Status].
48

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).

49

Id. § 2074(b).

50

Bill Summary and Status, supra note 47.

51

Id.
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accompanying Rule 502 but without amendment to the proposed rule, and
the President signed the rule into law on September 19, 2008.52
B. Distinguishing between Attorney–Client Privilege
and Work Product Doctrine
[14] The attorney–client privilege and the work product doctrine are
distinct evidentiary principles, each of which protects a different interest.53
“The attorney–client privilege protects the confidentiality of
communications between attorney and client made for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice.”54 Its purpose is “to promote communication
between attorney and client by protecting client confidences.”55 The
attorney–client privilege “is one of the oldest recognized privileges for
confidential communications.”56 Courts have narrowly construed the
attorney–client privilege.57

52

Id.

53

See Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 463 n.10 (D. Md. 1998);
see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 508 (1947); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d
980, 984 n.4 (4th Cir. 1992); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215,
1223 n.7 (4th Cir. 1976).
54

Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Am. Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
55

In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988); see Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (stating that the purpose of the attorney–client
privilege is “to encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice’”) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981)).
56

Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389); see Mohawk
Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888) (recognizing the attorney–client privilege).
57

NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (“The privilege remains an exception to the
general duty to disclose . . . . It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it

12
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[15] In contrast, the work product doctrine, first recognized in Hickman
v. Taylor,58 “essentially protects the attorney’s work and mental
impressions from adversaries and third parties even when communicated
to the client.”59 Put another way, the work product doctrine guards against
the discovery of “documents and tangible things that are prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, . . . or
agent).”60 Its purpose is to “shelter[] the mental processes of the attorney,
providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his
client’s case.”61 The doctrine affords the litigant “a broader protection,
designed to balance the needs of the adversary system: promotion of an
attorney’s preparation in representing a client versus society’s general
interest in revealing all true and material facts to the resolution of a
dispute.”62 Nonetheless, work product materials that are “otherwise
discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1),”63 (i.e., relevant and non-privileged), are
discoverable if the party seeking discovery “shows that it has substantial
need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue
hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”64

is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation for truth. It ought to be strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principles.”).
58

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; see Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 462; see also FED. R. EVID.
502 advisory committee’s note.
59

EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK–PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 1027 (5th ed. 2007).
60

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).

61

United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); see Trs. of Elec. Workers Loc. No.
26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2010)
(stating that the work product doctrine “creates a zone of privacy around counsel”).
62

In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Nobles, 422 U.S.
at 238)).
63

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i).

64

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).

13
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[16] Work product falls into two categories: opinion work product,
which contains the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories" of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the
litigation,”65 and fact, or “ordinary,” work product, which refers to
documents and things surrounding an attorney’s preparation of a client’s
case which extends to information the attorney or her agent, assembles “in
anticipation of litigation.”66 “[W]hat the work product doctrine is
fundamentally designed to protect against is disclosure of ‘pure’ mental
impressions or opinions of counsel.”67 In that vein, discovery under Rule
26(b)(3)(A) generally is available only for fact, not opinion, work
product.68
[17] Waiver of the attorney–client privilege and waiver of the workproduct protection result from different circumstances.69 Waiver of
attorney–client privilege “does not automatically waive whatever workproduct immunity that communication may also enjoy, as the two are
independent and grounded on different policies.”70 Therefore, “[w]aiver

65

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B).

66

EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 946; see Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183
F.R.D. 458, 462 (D. Md. 1998).
67

Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 466 (citing In re Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 625).

68

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (“If the court orders discovery of [attorney work
product], it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the
litigation.”); Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 496 (2009)
(“‘Whereas factual work product can be discovered solely upon a showing of substantial
need and undue hardship, mental process work product is afforded even greater, nearly
absolute, protection.’”) (quoting In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)); see also Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 462 (noting that opinion work product is
“‘nearly absolutely immune’ from discovery”).
69

See Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 464 n.10.

70

EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 1027.
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of the privilege should always be analyzed distinctly from waiver of work
product.”71
[18] Attorney–client privilege waiver occurs when the client or counsel
acts in a way “that is inconsistent with the continued maintenance of the
privilege.”72 Although now tempered by the protections of Rule 502, as
discussed infra, waiver of the attorney–client privilege may occur through
“any disclosure, intentional, or even inadvertent, which is inconsistent
with maintaining the communication as confidential.”73 The client holds
the privilege and has the ability to waive it, either expressly or impliedly.74
[19] Only disclosure “in a manner that is inconsistent with preserving
the secrecy of that information from an adversary” waives the work
product doctrine.75 Indeed, “‘the mere showing of a voluntary disclosure
to a third person . . . should not suffice in itself for waiver of the workproduct privilege,’” even though it would “‘generally suffice to show
waiver of the attorney–client privilege.’”76 Put another way, waiver of
work-product protection only may occur when “a disclosure has been
made which is consistent with a conscious disregard of the advantage that
is otherwise protected by the doctrine.”77 Thus, inadvertent disclosure,
which waives the attorney–client privilege, does not appear to waive the

71

Id.

72

Trs. of the Elec. Workers Loc. No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc.,
266 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010).
73

Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 464 n.10 (emphasis added) (citing McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank
of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 166–68 (D. Md. 1998)).
74

Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 501 (2009).

75

Trs. of the Elec. Workers Loc. No. 26 Pension Trust Fund, 266 F.R.D. at 15.

76

Id. at 14 (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
77

Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 464 n.10 (citing Doe v. United States, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081
(4th Cir. 1981)).
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“more robust” work product doctrine.78 The scope of waiver differs for
fact and opinion work product.79
C. Organization of Rule 502
[20] Rule 502 includes seven subsections: (1) disclosures in federal
proceedings or to an agency that involve waiver of the attorney–client
privilege or work-product protection, as well as the scope of that waiver;80
(2) inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected information, and when
such disclosure does or does not result in waiver of privilege or
protection;81 (3) disclosures in state proceedings, whether judicial or
administrative, where there is no state court order in effect governing
waiver of privileged or protected information;82 (4) the controlling effect
of a federal court order stating that privilege or protection is not waived by
disclosure, which is binding on parties and non-parties to the litigation,
and applies to other federal proceedings, as well as to state proceedings;83
(5) the effect of agreements between parties to federal proceedings to the
effect that a particular disclosure will not constitute waiver of privilege or
protection;84 (6) the controlling effect of Rule 502 as against all other
federal and state proceedings, as well as court-annexed or court-mandated

78

Id.; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 1037 (“Any inadvertent disclosure of work
product should not ordinarily entail subject matter waiver. Given the purposes that are
served by the work–product doctrine such a result would in ordinary circumstances be
perfectly extraordinary and entirely punitive for no cognizable judicial purpose.”).
79

See infra Part III.

80

FED. R. EVID. 502(a). For convenience, this Article will refer to the attorney–client
privilege as the “privilege” and work-product protection as “protection.”
81

FED. R. EVID. 502(b).

82

FED. R. EVID. 502(c).

83

FED. R. EVID. 502(d).

84

FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
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arbitration proceedings,85 and (7) definitions of the attorney–client
privilege and work product doctrine.86
[21] The Advisory Committee’s Note is crucial to a proper
understanding of the purpose, scope, and operation of the new rule, and it
provides vital guidance as to interpreting the rule in actual cases. The
introductory portion of the Committee’s Note is especially important, as it
discusses the purpose of the rule and clearly identifies the rule’s
objectives.87 As the note states, “[Rule 502] has two major purposes.”88
First, it is intended to “resolve[] longstanding disputes in the courts about
the effect of certain disclosures of communications or information
protected by the attorney–client privilege or as work product–specifically
those disputes involving inadvertent disclosure and subject matter
waiver.”89 Second, the rule is intended to “respond[] to the widespread
complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of
attorney–client privilege or work product have become prohibitive due to
the concern that any disclosure (however innocent or minimal) will
operate as a subject matter waiver of all protected communications or
information.”90 Cases involving ESI discovery heighten the fear of subject
matter waiver.91 It is important to realize that Rule 502 “trumps” or
supersedes court decisions rendered prior to the enactment of the rule that
are inconsistent with it.92
85

FED. R. EVID. 502(f).

86

FED. R. EVID. 502(g).

87

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

See id.

92

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (holding that a
new federal rule of evidence superseded a common law rule that is either not
incorporated or is inconsistent with the new rule).
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[22] Courts called upon to interpret Rule 502 should be especially
diligent in construing it in a manner that is consistent with its purpose.
Otherwise, its goal of “provid[ing] a predictable, uniform set of standards
under which parties can determine the consequences of a disclosure of a
communication or information covered by the attorney–client privilege or
work-product protection” cannot be achieved.93 The importance of this
comment cannot be overlooked. Rule 502 was enacted to provide lawyers
and clients with a roadmap of how to avoid or limit the effect of waiver of
privilege or work-product protection.94 It cannot function as intended if
some courts interpret it in a manner that is not in concert with its purpose,
because without uniform application, there can be no predictability.95
Absent this predictability, the rule is robbed of its primary justification.
[23] As this Article will demonstrate, some courts have interpreted Rule
502 in a fashion that undermines these two primary purposes, by
interpreting what “inadvertent” means in connection with Rule 502(b) in a
manner that makes its implementation more cumbersome than intended,96
or by rejecting as “unreasonable” efforts taken by lawyers to protect
against waiver of privilege or protection in circumstances where a strong
argument could be made that what was done was perfectly reasonable,
given the nature of the litigation.97 Other courts have taken what may be
regarded as an overly-restrictive approach in determining whether
agreements that counsel enter into to avoid waiver of privileged or
protected information pursuant to Rule 502(e) qualified for the protection
that subsection (e) is intended to provide.98 Still others appear to have

93

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

94

See id.

95

Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“An uncertain privilege, or
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts,
is little better than no privilege at all.”).
96

See infra Part IV.A.

97

See infra Part IV.B.

98

See infra Part VIII.
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engrafted a requirement of taking “reasonable” precautions against waiver
when interpreting sections of the rule that do not themselves impose these
requirements.99 It is sincerely hoped that in the future, reviewing courts
will achieve sufficient uniformity in interpreting Rule 502 in accordance
with its purpose to reach the twin goals of predictability and reduction of
litigation costs associated with discovery of ESI for lawyers and clients.
Interpreting the rule consistently with the discussion of its purpose
contained in the Advisory Committee notes is one way reviewing courts
can ensure that they are achieving these goals.
III. RULE 502(a)
[24]

Rule 502(a) states:
When the disclosure is made in a Federal proceeding or to a
Federal office or agency and waives the attorney–client
privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to
an undisclosed communication or information in a Federal
or State proceeding only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or
information concern the same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.100

As the rule makes clear, it applies to disclosures of privileged or protected
information made in a “federal proceeding” (judicial or administrative),101
or to a federal “office” or “agency.”102 Further, subsection (a) applies
when there has been (1) a disclosure that (2) “waives the attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection,” but it does not attempt to categorize

99

See infra Part VIII.

100

FED. R. EVID. 502(a).

101

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

102

FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
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the circumstances that could lead to the conclusion that a waiver has
occurred.103
[25] To determine whether the disclosure constituted a waiver of the
privilege or protection, you must look to: (1) Rule 502 itself (for example,
a waiver can occur if a court determines, pursuant to Rule 502(b), that a
party’s disclosure of privileged or protected information was not
inadvertent, despite that party’s claim that it was); or (2) the common law
of privilege or protection waiver to determine if there would be a waiver
under the circumstances of the case.104 If there has been a disclosure that
waives the privilege or protection, then Rule 502(a) provides that the
scope of that waiver is limited to what was actually disclosed, and does
not constitute broader subject matter waiver, unless (1) the waiver is
“intentional,” in which case the scope of the waiver extends to (2) “the
disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern[ing]
the same subject matter,” but only if (3) the undisclosed communications
or information “ought in fairness to be considered together” with the
disclosed communications or information.105
[26] Several important observations must be made about the text of
Rule 502(a). First, Rule 502(a) makes no attempt to define what the test is
to determine whether the disclosure constituted an “intentional” waiver.
The Committee’s Note offers guidance, however, by seeming to equate
“intentional” waiver with “voluntary disclosure” that constitutes a waiver
(under either Rule 502 or applicable common law), a conclusion supported
by additional language in the Committee’s Note that “[i]t follows that an
inadvertent disclosure of protected information can never result in a
subject matter waiver.”106 Thus, Rule 502(a) does not require a
demonstration that the party that disclosed the privileged or protected
information subjectively intended to waive the protection, but rather a

103

Id.

104

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

105

FED. R. EVID. 502(a).

106

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
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showing that the production was “voluntary” and not “inadvertent.”107
Accordingly, if a party meant to disclose the privileged or protected
information, knowing that it was privileged or protected information,108
even if it did not then intend to waive the privilege or protection, the
disclosure likely meets the “waiver is intentional” requirement of Rule
502(a).109

107

See id.

108

See, e.g., Seyler v. T-Sys. N. Am., Inc., No. 10 Misc. 7 (JGK), 2011 WL 196920, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011) (concluding that the plaintiff’s counsel’s production of an email between the plaintiff and her sister, which was covered by the attorney–client
privilege, “does not satisfy the higher standard of intentional waiver in Rule 502(a)”
because the plaintiff’s counsel “did not at the time [of production] know that the
plaintiff’s sister was a lawyer”).
109

See, e.g., Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009
WL 4949959, at *12 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s claim of
inadvertent disclosure of work product). In Silverstein, the court found instead that the
defendant disclosed the work product in order to “gain an advantage in the litigation,”
and having done so, made a “conscious decision” not to request that the protected
information be returned by its adversary. Id. at *7, 12. Concluding that a voluntary
disclosure of protected information to gain an advantage in the litigation was an
intentional waiver under Rule 502(a), the court ruled that Rule 502(a)(3) “subject matter
waiver” was appropriate because defendant “intentionally and willfully intended to
mislead the plaintiff and gain an advantage in the litigation.” Id. at *12-13. Accordingly,
the court extended the waiver to documents not disclosed, but concerning the same
subject matter as the disclosed work product document. Id. at *14. In Chick-Fil-A v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 08-61422-CIV, 2009 WL 3763032 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009),
the court found that Exxon “voluntarily disclosed to its adversary” work-product
protected information. Id. at *3. The court, while referencing Rule 502 to address the
scope of waiver, held “[a]ccordingly, . . . that Exxon counsel’s intentional, voluntary
disclosure to Chick-fil-A of attorney Quiralte’s Memorandum waived Exxon’s work
product protection.” Id. Likewise, in Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, the Court
of Federal Claims rejected the defendant’s contention that its production of work product
information did not constitute a waiver because it was inadvertent pursuant to Rule
502(b). 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 510 (2009). Instead, the court held that production was
intentional because the defendant had produced the work product information on three
separate occasions and in a manner “so careless that it [could not] be construed as
inadvertent.” Id. Therefore, the court looked to Rule 502(a) to determine the scope of
the waiver. Id. at 520–21.
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[27] The Advisory Committee’s Note identifies the “evil” Rule 502(a)
was intended to protect against, namely “situations in which a party
intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective,
misleading and unfair manner.”110 This language provides additional
support for the notion that the words “waiver is intentional” used in Rule
502(a) are synonymous with “voluntary,” as opposed to “inadvertent,”
disclosure. Therefore, Rule 502(a) does not require a showing of
subjective intent to waive privilege or protection.111 The principle is that a
party cannot have its cake and eat it too. If a party voluntarily discloses
only a portion of privileged or protected information that is helpful to its
litigation position, while concomitantly refusing to disclose harmful
privileged or protected information relating to the same subject matter,
such “selective” disclosure would be both misleading and unfair.112 Thus,
the correct interpretation of the words “waiver is intentional” as used in
Rule 502(a) is that the disclosure of privileged or protected information
was voluntary, purposeful, and advertent, and that under either Rule 502
or common law, such a disclosure constitutes a waiver.113
[28] The second noteworthy observation about Rule 502(a) is that, in
discussing the waiver of undisclosed work product information of the
same subject matter as that which was disclosed, the rule makes no
attempt to distinguish between fact work product and opinion work
product.114 In contrast, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which
“codifies the work product doctrine,”115 distinguishes between “opinion”
work product—disclosure of which, Rule 26(b)(3)(B) cautions, courts
“must protect against”—and “fact” work product, to which Rule
110

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

111

See id.

112

See id.

113

Id.

114

See FED. R. EVID. 502(a) (mentioning waiver of “work-product protection” without
clarification).
115

Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 462 n.6 (D. Md. 1998).
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26(b)(3)(B) does not pertain.116 A court may order a party to disclose
“fact” work product to an adversary that can show “it has substantial need
for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship,
obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”117 Rule 502(a)
identifies circumstances in which work product waiver can extend to
“subject matter” waiver, and it defines the scope of such waiver.118 The
rule does not define the circumstances that can constitute such a waiver.
Instead, it focuses only on the extent of any waiver that has occurred.119
The common law and the other provisions of Rule 502 supply the
circumstances that constitute a waiver.120
[29] Despite the rule’s failure to address opinion and fact work product
directly with respect to the scope of any waiver, reviewing courts have
discovered an effective way to harmonize Rule 502 with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(B) (“Rule 26(b)(3)(B)”). They simply have held
that the third element of Rule 502(a)—which provides that the scope of
work product waiver extends to undisclosed communications or
information relating to the same subject matter as the work product that
intentionally was waived by disclosure, but only if the undisclosed work
product “ought in fairness” be considered together with the disclosed work
product—generally excludes opinion work product.121 The courts have
116

Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (protecting “mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the
litigation”), with Reitz v. City of Mt. Juliet, 680 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (M.D. Tenn. 2010)
(citing Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293
F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2002)) (“‘Fact’ work product, which reflects information received
by the lawyer, receives less protection than ‘opinion’ work product, which reflects the
lawyer's ‘mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, judgments, or legal theories.’”).
117

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).

118

FED. R. EVID. 502(a).

119

Id.

120

See generally FED. R. EVID. 502; see also FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s
note.
121

See, e.g., Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund
Advisors, 266 F.R.D. 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2010) (“After enactment of Rule 502, the
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done so on the theory that Rule 26(b)(3)(B) establishes that it is unfair to
include opinion work product.122
[30] If the language in Rule 502(a)(3), “ought in fairness,” sounds
somehow familiar, it is because it originates in Federal Rule of Evidence

questions are whether the disclosed and undisclosed information concern the same
subject matter and whether they ought in fairness be considered together. Thus, there is
not now, and there has never been, the absolute subject-matter waiver that supposedly
flows from the disclosure of work-product.”); Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No.
07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 4949959, at *13 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (“Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) continues to provide special protection for opinion
work product . . . . Thus, when considering the fairness of granting a subject-matter
waiver of work-product protection pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a), the court
must pay close attention to the special protection afforded opinion work product.”);
Chick-Fil-A v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 08-61422-CIV, 2009 WL 3763032, at *7 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 10, 2009), (citing with approval Eden Isle Marina, and concluding that “rule
502 does not abrogate [governing Circuit authority] that ‘the subject-matter waiver
doctrine does not extend to materials protected by the opinion work product privilege’”);
Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 430 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that it would be unfair
and not within the interests of justice to conclude that, despite a party’s failure to show
that production of privileged and work product-protected materials inadvertently were
produced pursuant to Rule 502(b), waiver should extend to opinion work product); Eden
Isle Marina v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. at 504-05 (“Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a)
lacks any explicit language distinguishing between fact work product and opinion work
product. However, . . . Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(B) . . . continue[s] to
provide special protection for opinion work product . . . . Thus, when considering the
fairness of granting a subject-matter waiver of work-product protection pursuant to . . .
502(a), the court must pay close attention to the special protection afforded opinion work
product.”); see also In re EchoStar Commcn’s Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (concluding that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), opinion work product
“deserves the highest protection from disclosure”); Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie,
17 F.3d 1386, 1422, modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“‘opinion
work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare
and extraordinary circumstances’”) (quoting In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir.
1977)).
122

See Eden Isle Marina, 89 Fed. Cl. at 504–05; see also Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959,
at *13; Chick-fil-A, 2009 WL 3763032, at *7; Peterson, 262 F.R.D. at 430.
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106, the so-called “rule of completeness.”123 The “rule of completeness”
prevents a party from selectively referring only to part of a document or
statement in a manner that is unfair or misleading.124 This concept fits
well with the underlying purpose of Rule 502(a)(3): to prevent selective
disclosure of helpful portions of privileged or protected information, while
concomitantly withholding related information that is not helpful.125
[31] Nonetheless, even though “Rule 26(b)(3) seems to give absolute
protection for the mental impressions and opinions of an attorney,”126 and
“a mere showing of need and an inability to obtain the work product by
other means is not sufficient to pierce the protection accorded to opinion
work product,”127 it is a mistake to say that Rule 502(a)(3)’s fairness
provision categorically prohibits subject matter waiver of opinion work
product across the board. Indeed, the Supreme Court “rejected a proposed
amendment to Rule 30(b) that would have given opinion work product
absolute protection,”128 and later “explicitly declined to rule on the
question of whether opinion work product, like materials protected by the
123

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“The language [in Rule 502(a)]
concerning subject matter waiver–‘ought in fairness’-is taken from Rule 106, because the
animating principle is the same. Under both Rules, a party that makes a selective,
misleading presentation that is unfair to the adversary opens itself to a more complete and
accurate presentation.”).
124

See id.

125

Id. See generally Johnson Outdoors, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 05-0522, 2011
WL 196825, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan 19, 2011) (holding that the attorney–client privilege
had been waived because the plaintiff relied on the attorney–client communications to
support its claims, the withheld documents concerned the same subject matter, and “it
serve[d] the interests of justice for all the communications to be considered together”);
Dubler v. Hangsterfer’s Labs., No. 09-5144, 2011 WL 90244, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 11,
2011) (finding subject-matter waiver of intentionally produced documents because it
would be “unfair to allow a client to assert a privilege and prevent disclos[ure] of alleged
damaging documents but to allow the client to disclose other communications for selfserving purposes regarding the same subject matter”).
126

EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 946.

127

Id. at 947.

128

Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992).
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attorney–client privilege, should be absolutely immune from discovery.”129
The better approach is to recognize that, although greater protections
surround opinion work product, it can be waived in certain circumstances,
as provided for in the common law.130 For example, in In re Martin
Marietta Corp.,131 some, but not all, work product materials were
produced during settlement negotiations, and the court considered
whether, through that disclosure, the party impliedly waived work-product
protection for those documents and other documents of the same subject
matter.132 The court concluded that the protection was waived as to fact,
but not opinion, work product previously disclosed and other fact work
product on the same subject matter.133 However, the court noted that
“actual disclosure of pure mental impressions may be deemed waiver” and
that “there may be indirect waiver [of opinion work product] in extreme
circumstances.”134

129

EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 947.

130

See, e.g., Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 463 (D. Md. 1998)
(discussing discoverability and waiver of opinion work product). In Nutramax, the court
noted that “the work product doctrine was not intended to ‘endow lawyers as individuals
with an untouchable status,’ nor was it intended to be a ‘fringe benefit’ for lawyers who
abuse the very judicial system the work product rule is intended to protect.” Id. (quoting
In re John Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981)). Furthermore, the court held:
If otherwise discoverable documents, which do not contain pure
expressions of legal theories, mental impressions, conclusions or
opinions of counsel, are assembled by counsel, and are put to a
testimonial use in the litigation, then an implied limited waiver of the
work product doctrine takes place, and the documents themselves, not
their broad subject matter, are discoverable.
Id. at 467.
131

856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).

132

Id. at 621, 624–26.

133

Id. at 625.

134

Id. at 626.
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[32] Moreover, even courts that have held that Rule 502(a)(3)
incorporates the special protection Federal Rule Civil Procedure
26(b)(3)(B) affords to opinion work product have found that 502(a)
subject matter waiver may extend to undisclosed opinion work product if
the work product concerned the same subject matter of previously
disclosed work product information that had been “intentionally and
willfully” disclosed to the plaintiff during discovery to mislead the
plaintiff “and gain an advantage in the litigation, six days before the close
of discovery.”135 Accordingly, while it is appropriate for courts to
consider carefully whether intentional waiver of work product protected
information should be limited to what was willfully produced, and in
doing so keep in mind the special protection afforded to opinion work
product, it would not be appropriate to adopt an absolute, or near-absolute,
prohibition against finding subject matter waiver even as to undisclosed
opinion work product that had intentionally been disclosed. In such cases,
the interests of fairness (including mitigating the effects of an unfair and
misleading selective disclosure of work product) may warrant such subject
matter waiver.
[33] The third and final observation is that, to ensure uniform
“protection and predictability” of rulings under Rule 502(a), “the rule
provides that if a disclosure is made at the federal level, the federal rule on
subject matter waiver governs subsequent state court determinations on
the scope of the waiver by that disclosure.”136
IV. RULE 502(b)
[34] As noted above, one of the primary goals of Rule 502 was to
resolve “disputes involving inadvertent disclosure” of privileged or
protected information.137 Accordingly, it is not surprising that the vast
majority of court cases interpreting the Rule have focused on the 502(b)
135

Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL
4949959, at *13 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009).
136

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

137

Id.
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subsection, which addresses inadvertent disclosure.138 Unfortunately, this
scrutiny has not always resulted in uniform interpretation of 502(b), which
undermines the very purpose of the Rule.139
[35]

Rule 502(b) states:
When made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office
or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a
Federal or State proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to
rectify the error, including (if applicable)
following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B).140

As with Rule 502(a), the protections against waiver of privilege or
protection found in subsection (b) govern both federal and state
proceedings, meaning that if under subsection (b) disclosure is not viewed
as a waiver, it also will not be a waiver under the law of any state, even if
the identical conduct would be a waiver under the law of that state.141 The
138

See, e.g., Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 209 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Rule 502(b) retains
- without codifying - the multifactor test set out in the case law, which is “a set of nondeterminative guidelines that vary from case to case.’”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(b)
advisory committee’s note).
139

Compare Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 658–59 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (analyzing the
circumstances surrounding the inadvertent disclosure to determine whether privilege was
waived), with Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032,
1038 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that waiver is based on “whether the party intended a
privileged or work–product protected document to be produced or whether the production
was a mistake”).
140

FED. R. EVID. 502(b).

141

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (holding that a
new federal rule of evidence superseded a common law rule not incorporated or
inconsistent with the new rule); see also FED. R. EVID. 502(c).
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protections of subsection (b) also apply to federal court-annexed and
federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings.142 Additionally, 502(b)’s
protections apply if three conditions are met: (1) disclosure is
“inadvertent” (a word that the rule itself does not define); (2) the holder of
the privilege or protection “took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure”;
and (3) and the holder also “promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error” when it was discovered, including compliance with Federal Rule
Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), if applicable.143
A. Rule 502(b)(1): “Inadvertent” Production
[36] As noted, Rule 502(b) does not define “inadvertent,” and there has
been a surprising amount of disagreement among reviewing courts as to
what that word should mean in the context of the rule. In Heriot v.
Byrne,144 the court looked to pre-502 case law, which employed a multifactor test to determine if the disclosure of privileged or protected
information was inadvertent.145 The court said: “To determine whether a
disclosure was inadvertent, ‘this Court has . . . look[ed] to factors such as

142

FED. R. EVID. 502(f).

143

FED. R. EVID. 502(b). Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides:
Information Produced. If information produced in discovery
is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received
the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a
party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the
information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to
retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified;
and may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a
determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the
information until the claim is resolved.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

144

257 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

145

Id. at 659–62.
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the total number of documents reviewed, the procedures used to review
the documents before they were produced, and the actions of [the]
producing party after discovering that the documents had been
produced.’”146 The court in Silverstein took the same approach, noting
“[c]ourts have considered a number of factors to determine inadvertency,
including the number of documents produced in discovery, the level of
care with which the review for privilege was conducted, and the actions of
the producing party after discovering that the document had been
produced.”147
[37] Having done so, however, the Heriot and Silverstein courts then
used essentially the same factors again to determine whether, under Rule
502(b)(2), the producing party had taken reasonable steps to prevent
disclosure of privileged or protected information, an approach that is both
cumbersome and redundant.148 Thus, by using the factors that apply to a
502(b)(2) analysis, the courts unnecessarily incorporated a
“reasonableness” evaluation in determining whether, under Rule
502(b)(1), production of attorney–client privileged documents was
inadvertent.
[38] This approach does not make sense, and evaluating reasonableness
to determine inadvertence creates confusion. It is true that the dictionary

146

Id. at 658–59 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).

147

Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL
4949959, at *10 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (citation omitted).
148

Id. at *11; Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 660; see Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors
LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38, (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Rule 502 does not define
‘inadvertent.’ Under the prior case law, reaching the conclusion that a document had
been ‘inadvertently produced’ required analysis of the circumstances surrounding the
production, including the number of documents produced in discovery and the care with
which the pre-production document review was performed. If the production was found
to be inadvertent, the court used a ‘balancing approach’ to determine whether the
inadvertent disclosure waived the privilege. In that step, many of the same factors, such
as scope of discovery and reasonableness of precautions taken, were reviewed again.”)
(citations omitted).
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definition of “inadvertence” is “a result of inattention” or “oversight,”149
and the factors the Heriot and Silverstein courts looked to are logically
relevant to determining whether a party’s production was through
oversight or inattention, as opposed to being purposeful. However, to
require a court to review essentially the same factors again under Rule
502(b) in assessing whether the producing party took reasonable
precautions to avoid production of privileged or protected material is
duplicative and inefficient. Either production was inadvertent or it was
not.150 If production was not inadvertent, Rule 502(b) does not apply.151 If
production was inadvertent, then, and only then, should a court consider
“reasonableness” to assess whether there was waiver.
[39] A number of courts have taken a more useful approach,
simplifying the Rule 502(b)(1) analysis by equating “inadvertence” under
Rule 502(b)(1) with “mistaken” or “unintentional” production, and then
using the multi-factor tests found in pre-502 case law to measure
reasonableness under Rule 502(b)(2) and (3). For example, in Coburn
Group, the court squarely addressed the confusion caused by the
cumbersome pre-502 case law, concluding:
In this court’s view, the structure of Rule 502
suggests that the analysis under subpart (b)(1) is intended
to be much simpler, essentially asking whether the party
intended a privileged or work-product protected document
to be produced or whether the production was a mistake.
To start, the parallel structure of subparts (a)(1) and (b)(1)
of Rule 502 contrasts a waiver that is intentional with a
disclosure that is inadvertent. More importantly, subparts
(b)(2) and (b)(3) separately address the reasonableness of
the privilege holder’s steps to prevent disclosure and to

149

WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 607 (1990).

150

See Coburn Grp., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (stating that the analysis under 502(b)(1)
only involves whether the party intended to produce the document or produced it by
mistake).
151

See id.
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rectify the error. That they are set out as separate subparts
distinct from the question of inadvertent disclosure strongly
suggests that the drafters did not intend the court to
consider for subpart (b)(1) facts such as the number of
documents produced only to repeat the consideration of
those same facts for subparts (b)(2) and (b)(3).152
[40] Other courts have followed the same approach.153 In Amobi v.
D.C. Department of Corrections, the court explained why it would “use
the word ‘inadvertent’ from Rule 502 to mean an unintended
disclosure.”154 It reasoned:
Rule 502 does not define inadvertent disclosure. Prior to
the rule, the court of appeals did not distinguish between
inadvertent and other types of disclosure; however, other
courts that followed a less strict construction of waiver
considered a number of factors to determine inadvertency,
including the number of documents produced in discovery,
the level of care with which the review for privilege was

152

Id. (footnotes omitted).

153

See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No. 09-C-3607, 2010 WL 4512337, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010) (noting the various approaches courts have taken to define
“inadvertence” under 502(b)(1) and reasoning that the “simpler” approach of whether
production was inadvertent, a la Coburn Group, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1038, was “more
compelling” than the multi-factored approach taken in Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 655, 658-59
because “it would seem repetitive to apply factors from the balancing approach when
Rule 502(b) explicitly requires examination of some of those same factors later in the
analysis”); Gilday v. Kenra, Ltd., No. 1:09-cv-00229-TWP-TAB, 2010 WL 3928593, at
*4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2010) (concluding that disclosure was inadvertent because defendant
“did not intentionally produce the privileged documents”); see also Eden Isle Marina,
Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 504 (2009) (“Thus, unintentional disclosures do
‘not operate as a waiver’ of protection if the disclosing party establishes the elements set
forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) . . . .”); Multiquip, Inc. v. Water Mgmt. Sys.
LLC, No. CV 08-403-S-EJL-REB, 2009 WL 4261214, at *4 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2009)
(“The analysis under FRE 502(b)(1) essentially asks whether the party intended a
privileged document to be produced or whether the production was a mistake.”).
154

262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009).
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conducted and even the actions of the producing party after
discovering that the document had been produced. Other
courts have found that Rule 502(b) provides for a more
simple analysis of considering if the party intended to
produce a privileged document or if the production was a
mistake. This interpretation seems to be in line with one of
the goals of the drafting committee: to devise a rule to
protect privilege in the fact of an innocent mistake.
Additionally, defining inadvertent as mistaken
comports with the dictionary definition of the word: “Of
persons, their dispositions, etc.: Not properly attentive or
observant; inattentive, negligent; heedless . . . . Of actions,
etc.: Characterized by want of attention or taking notice;
hence, unintentional.” . . . Additionally, permitting
“inadvertence” to be a function of, for example, the amount
of information that had to be reviewed or the time taken to
prevent the disclosure melds two concepts, “inadvertence”
and “reasonable efforts,” that should be kept distinct. One
speaks to whether the disclosure was unintended while the
other speaks to what efforts were made to prevent it.155
[41] The courts that have construed “inadvertence” under Rule
502(b)(1) as the equivalent of “unintentional” or “mistaken” have adopted
an approach that is much more consistent with Rule 502 as a whole (in
which the focus of 502(a) is intentional disclosure, and 502(b) is the
opposite of that, namely, mistaken or unintentional disclosure). This
approach makes far more sense than the approach taken by the courts that
have adhered to the pre-502 case law and repetitively applied the same
balancing factors to determine inadvertence as to measure reasonableness
of actions taken to prevent disclosure of privileged or protected
information. It is hoped that over time this far simpler and commonsense
approach will become the prevailing view.

155

Id. (internal citations omitted).
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B. Rule 502(b)(2): Reasonable Pre-Production
Steps to Avoid Disclosure
[42] Rule 502(b)(2) requires that, in addition to the production of
privileged or protected information being inadvertent, the producing party
also must have taken “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure . . . .”156 The
Advisory Committee’s Note acknowledges the existence of a number of
pre-502 cases that adopted a multi-factor test to determine whether
inadvertent production of privileged or protected information would
constitute a waiver, which included: (1) “the reasonableness of precautions
taken[;]” (2) “the time taken to rectify the [erroneous production;]” (3)
“the scope of discovery[;]” (4) “the extent of disclosure[;]”and (5) “the
overriding issue of fairness.”157 However, the Advisory Committee
observed:
[Rule 502] does not explicitly codify [the multi-factor] test,
because it is really a set of non-determinative guidelines
that vary from case to case. The rule is flexible enough to
accommodate any of those listed factors.
Other
considerations bearing on the reasonableness of a
producing party’s efforts include the number of documents
to be reviewed and the time constraints for production.
Depending on the circumstances, a party that uses
advanced analytical software applications and linguistic
tools in screening for privilege and work product may be
found to have taken “reasonable steps” to prevent
inadvertent disclosure. The implementation of an efficient
system of records management before litigation may also
be relevant.158

156

FED. R. EVID. 502(b).

157

FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (citing Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
158

Id.
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[43] There are several important take-away points in the Committee’s
Note. First, the pre-502 case law that adopted a multi-factor test for
determining whether inadvertent production of privileged or protected
information constituted a waiver is not automatically incorporated into
Rule 502(b).159 Rather, the rule is intended to allow additional factors to
be considered.160 Thus, the prior case law is relevant, but not dispositive,
and courts should feel free to adopt a flexible approach that considers all
facts relevant to determining the reasonableness of the producing party’s
efforts to avoid disclosure of privileged or work product protected
information.161 And, consistent with Rule 502’s goal of reducing the cost

159

Indeed, a number of courts have observed that, although the multi-factor tests referred
to in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 502(b) are relevant to determining whether
reasonable pre-production measures were taken to prevent disclosure of privileged or
protected information, they are not dispositive. See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc.,
No. 09-C-3607, 2010 WL 4512337, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010) (“[C]ourts agree that
relevant factors from the previous balancing approach may be used to guide our
decision.” (emphasis added)); N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No.
2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL 1873291, at *8 (S.D. Ohio. May 10, 2010) (“Rule 502 does not
set forth a five factor test [referenced in the Advisory Committee’s Note] for determining
waiver; instead, Rule 502(b) sets forth three elements that must be met in order to prevent
the disclosure of privileged materials from operating as waiver.”) (citing FED. R. EVID.
502(b)); Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 262 F.R.D. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating
that the common law multi-factor tests referenced in the Advisory Committee’s Note to
Rule 502(b) provides “non-dispositive factors a court may consider . . . . Despite this
guidance, the Committee indicates that it consciously chose not to codify any factors in
the rule because the analysis should be flexible and should be applied on a case by case
basis”); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL
2905474, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (observing that Rule 502(b) adopts “essentially”
the same approach as the pre-502 cases for determining whether reasonable steps were
taken to avoid disclosure of privileged or protected information); see also Eden Isle
Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 502 (2009) (noting that 502 does not
“‘explicitly codify’” the pre-502 common law multi-factor test for determining
inadvertent disclosure) (citation omitted); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 655 n.7 (N.D.
Ill. 2009) (determining that pre-502 common law multi-factor tests for pre-production
reasonableness, supplement, not supplant, Rule 502(b)(2) analysis).
160

See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.

161

See, e.g., N. Am. Rescue Prods., 2010 WL 1873291, at *9 (“[The pre-502 five factor
balancing test] is not mandatory and merely serves to guide a court’s analysis when
appropriate under the particular circumstances of each case.”); Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 54
(noting that although Fed. R. Evid. 502 Advisory Committee’s Note refers to the pre-502
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associated with discovery in general and discovery of ESI in particular, a
court called upon to make an assessment of pre-production reasonableness
under Rule 502(b)(2) should be especially mindful of the proportionality
factors set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C).162
Determining whether reasonable precautions have been taken cannot be
done in a vacuum, and considerations of how much is at stake in the
litigation and the resources of the party that inadvertently produced the
privileged or protected information are both appropriate and necessary to
ensure a proper interpretation of Rule 502(b)(2).
[44] Second–and crucially–the Committee’s Note stresses how
important it is that reviewing courts be receptive to the use of search and
information retrieval methods that facilitate pre-production review of ESI
multi-factor test, which includes “the overriding issue of fairness,” the drafters
“consciously chose not to codify any factors in the rule because the analysis should be
flexible and should be applied on a case by case basis”); Sensient Colors, 2009 WL
2905474, at *3 & n.8 (stating that Rule 502(b) adopts an approach that is “essentially the
same” as pre-502 multi-factor cases, and is designed to be flexible, with “no one factor
[that] is dispositive” (citing Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note)); Peterson v.
Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 428-29 (D.N.J. 2009) (observing that Rule 502(b) adopts a test
that is “essentially the same” as pre-502 multi-factor tests, but the test is a flexible one,
and the court is not required to accept bare allegations that a party conducted a reasonable
pre-production review, and concluding that “[t]he interests of fairness and justice would
not be served by relieving [the] plaintiff of the consequences of [his or her] counsel’s
error” in failing to do a reasonable pre-production privilege review).
162

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) provides:
When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit
the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules
or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to
obtain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.
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via computer-based analytical methods, rather than the far more laborintensive and expensive process of having lawyers review each digital
document.163 Simply put, one of the “two major purposes” of Rule 502
was to bring down the cost of pre-production review of ESI by enabling
lawyers and parties to use computer-based analytical methods to search for
and identify privileged and protected information, as well as other
analytical methods, such as sampling, that avoid the enormous expense
associated with personal review of each digital document.164 The rule
cannot achieve this goal if lawyers do not use these analytical methods, or
if courts do not support their use by acknowledging that when the methods
are properly used, they are reasonable.165
[45] The analytical methods are reasonable, even though operators
cannot guarantee the methods will identify and withhold from production
every privileged or protected document.166 Reviewing courts must
remember that the bellwether test under Rule 502(b)(2) is reasonableness,
not perfection.167 If courts find waiver in cases where parties use
163

FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.

164

See Gilday v. Kenra, Ltd., No. 1:09-cv-00229-TWP-TAB, 2010 WL 3928593, at *5
(S.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2010) (“[H]ad [defense] counsel double-or triple-checked its privilege
log against its production, this whole argument may have been avoided. However, as this
Court observed in Alcon Manufacturing Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLYTAB, 2008 WL 5070465, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008), ‘this type of expensive,
painstaking review is precisely what new Evidence Rule 502 . . . [was] designed to
avoid.’”).
165

It is important to stress that use of computer-based analytical search and information
retrieval methods involves technical and specialized methodology, and requires
competence and expertise. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D.
251, 260 (D. Md. 2008). Merely using key word searches, concept searching, linguistic
analysis, or sampling does not guarantee reasonableness, if the operators do not use the
methodology properly. Id.
166

See id. at 262.

167

See Multiquip, Inc. v. Water Mgmt. Sys. LLC, No. CV 08-403-S-EJL-REB, 2009 WL
4261214, at *1–2, 5 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2009) (finding that, despite defendant’s reliance
on his e-mail server’s “autofill” address function when forwarding an e-mail from his
attorney—which resulted in it being sent to an unintended recipient who forwarded it on
and, ultimately, it being provided to plaintiff’s attorney—there was no failure to meet
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computer analytical tools properly, yet the parties’ privileged or protected
information nonetheless is disclosed, then lawyers and clients never will
transition away from the burdensome and very expensive methods that
have lead to “the widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to
protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have
become prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however
innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver of all
protected communications or information.”168 Further, courts and litigants
must remember that determining waiver is not an abstract exercise.169
Aggravating circumstances in a particular case may lead a court to find
waiver where a party employed an otherwise-reasonable search
protocol.170 However, practitioners should not use such cases as guidance
for assessing use of similar protocols under different circumstances.171
Rule 502(b)(2) pre-production reasonableness, because the defendant’s actions, though
“hasty and imperfect,” were not unreasonable, as the autofill function had not previously
resulted in sending an e-mail to the wrong person); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc.,
No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (stating that
plaintiff made “a commendable effort to employ a sophisticated computer program to
conduct its privilege review,” but that, “[u]nfortunately, mistakes occurred,” and
“Plaintiff should not be unduly punished for occasional mistakes that occurred while it
started to use new software to organize and sort its documents,” because it employed
twelve professionals to assist in the pre-production review for privilege and performed
quality assurance/quality control to ensure completeness of the review and minimize false
negatives and false positives); Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F.
Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“The standard of Rule 502(b)(2) is not ‘all
reasonable means,’ it is ‘reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.’”); Heriot v. Byrne, 257
F.R.D. 645, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that all Rule 502(b)(2) required was
reasonable precautions to prevent against disclosure of privileged or protected
information, and that review of documents by paralegals before producing them was
reasonable, and error by the vendor resulting in mistaken production to defendant of
privileged documents did not render plaintiff’s efforts unreasonable).
168

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (citing Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232
F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005)).
169

See, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 136 (S.D.W. Va.
2010).
170

See id.

171

Cf. id.
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[46] For example, in Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Felman Production,
Inc., the court held that the plaintiff waived attorney–client privilege by
inadvertently producing an attorney–client privileged e-mail.172 The court
found the plaintiff’s e-mail production was inadvertent under Rule
502(b)(1), and that the plaintiff complied with Rule 502(b)(3) by promptly
demanding its return upon realizing that the e-mail had been produced to
the defendant.173 Nevertheless, the court found that the plaintiff had not
met Rule 502(b)(2) because the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps
prior to the production of the e-mail to avoid its disclosure.174 The court
reached this conclusion even though the plaintiff took what many would
view as extensive precautions to avoid production of privileged
information.175 The plaintiff negotiated an ESI stipulation with the
defendants addressing the return of inadvertently-produced privileged
information; hired an ESI vendor to assist in the collection, processing,
and review of ESI prior to production; involved its own IT department to
assist in the collection, processing, and review of ESI; selected search
terms to retrieve documents responsive to the defendants’ Rule 34 request;
selected privilege search terms to help identify privileged or work product
protected information; and tested the effectiveness of the privilege search
terms against the plaintiff’s e-mail files prior to production.176 The ESI
vendor the plaintiff hired used Concordance Software, manufactured by
LexisNexis, to process the ESI and apply the search terms.177 Despite the
measures the plaintiff took, as to one of the database files, this software
“inexplicably built an incomplete index of potentially privileged
materials.”178 Although the record showed that LexisNexis was unable to

172

Id. at 138.

173

Id. at 133.

174

Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 136.

175

Id. at 135.

176

Id.

177

Id. at 135–36.

178

Id. at 136.
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explain how this error occurred, and despite the precautions that the
plaintiff’s counsel took, the court concluded that the plaintiff and its
lawyers “failed to perform critical quality control sampling to determine
whether their production was appropriate and neither over-inclusive nor
under-inclusive.”179 Accordingly, the court concluded that, because the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it had taken reasonable steps to prevent
disclosure of the privileged e-mail, it failed to comply with Rule
502(b)(2), thus effecting a waiver of the privilege as to that e-mail.180
[47] The Mt. Hawley court evaluated whether the plaintiff took
reasonable steps to prevent the production of attorney–client privileged
communications within the “context of the [plaintiff’s] overall e-discovery
production.”181 In this regard, the court painstakingly analyzed the steps
the plaintiff took. It noted that the attorney–client privileged e-mail was
produced from a Concordance file afflicted by a software error that
created “an incomplete index of potentially privileged materials.”182 Yet,
the court also noted that the plaintiff inadvertently produced 377 other
privileged documents from Concordance files without software errors and
without incomplete indexes of potentially privileged communications.183
Moreover, the court observed that there were many other deficiencies
associated with the plaintiff’s ESI production. These deficiencies included
the facts that more than thirty percent of its ESI production, roughly one
million pages, consisted of irrelevant “junk documents” that significantly
added to the defendants’ burden of reviewing the ESI it received; that the
plaintiff marked each page of its massive ESI production as
“confidential,” making a “mockery” out of the court’s form protective
order; that, despite the ESI stipulation, the plaintiff failed to claw-back
some of the privileged documents it produced; that certain documents

179

Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 136.

180

Id.

181

Id. at 127.

182

Id. at 136.

183

Id.

40

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

claimed as privileged did not appear on any privilege log; that the plaintiff
failed to test to determine whether its ESI production was either over-or
under-inclusive; and that the plaintiff failed to perform simple keyword
searches that would have identified the critical privileged communication
that the plaintiff disclosed to the defendants.184 Further, the court found
grounds to conduct in-camera review of proclaimed privileged documents
because the defendants made a sufficient showing that in-camera review
was appropriate to determine whether the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney–client privilege applied.185
[48] The court also criticized the plaintiff for accusing defense counsel
of ethical violations.186 The plaintiff claimed that defense counsel
reviewed what they should have known were inadvertently produced
privileged communications without notifying the plaintiff.187 The plaintiff
based the objection upon a withdrawn ABA ethics opinion that no longer
was applicable.188 When viewed in totality, the court found pervasive
failures in the plaintiff’s compliance with its discovery obligations.189
This undoubtedly affected the willingness of the court to give the plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt in analyzing whether the plaintiff took reasonable
precautions to avoid disclosure of privileged information pursuant to Rule
502(b)(2).
[49] The Mt. Hawley court was correct in scrutinizing the precautions
plaintiff’s counsel undertook. The court cannot be faulted for pointing out
shortcomings such as the failure to test the reliability of key word
searches.190 However, in doing so, the court set the bar quite high for what
184

Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 128, 136.

185

Id. at 138.

186

Id. at 130.

187

Id.

188

Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 130–31.

189

Id. at 131.

190

Id. at 136.
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it thought a party must do to avoid a finding of unreasonableness in
circumstances in which plaintiff’s counsel took what many would regard
as extensive precautions to avoid production of privileged or protected
information.191
[50] Mt. Hawley illustrates the challenge to courts, lawyers, and
litigants.
Where do you draw the line between reasonable and
unreasonable pre-production measures taken to avoid disclosures of
privileged or protected information in cases where precautionary steps
were taken, but were insufficient to prevent disclosure of all privileged or
protected information? Rule 502 will never reach its intended goal of
reducing the cost of ESI discovery and encouraging the use of computer
analytical review methodology if courts demand near-perfection in preproduction precautions. If, as Voltaire said, “the perfect is the enemy of
the good,”192 it is also a disincentive for counsel and clients to accept the
Advisory Committee’s invitation to abandon costly “eyes-on” review of
all documents, even voluminous ESI, in favor of “advanced analytical
software applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and
work product.”193 It is hoped that future courts will be receptive and
accommodating to the use of these screening methods to prevent
disclosure of privileged and protected information. While these methods
are not perfect, there is growing evidence that they are as good, or far
better than, “eyes on” review of all digital information by an attorney or
paralegal.194 There is every reason to believe that computer-based

191

See id. at 135–36.

192

Voltaire Quotes, FAMOUS QUOTES,
aspx?Voltaire (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
193

http://www.famous-quotes.net/Author.

FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.

194

See Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in EDiscovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review,
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2011) http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i3/article11.pdf (stating that
“[e]-discovery processes that use automated tools to prioritize and select documents for
review are typically regarded as potential cost-savers—but inferior alternatives—to
exhaustive manual review, in which a cadre of reviewers assess every document for
responsiveness to a production request, and for privilege,” and then “offer[ing] evidence
that such technology-assisted processes, while indeed less expensive, can also yield
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screening methods’ recall (completeness) and precision (accuracy) rates
will continue to improve.195
[51] Third, courts should keep in mind that, even though the
Committee’s Note encourages a flexible standard for evaluating
reasonableness under Rule 502(b)(2), the inquiry still is to determine
“reasonableness of precautions taken.”196 The inquiry is not whether a
finding of unreasonableness, and consequently waiver, would be “fair.”197
It is true that the “overriding issue of fairness” was one of the several
factors included in one of the frequently-cited pre-502 tests applied to
determine whether inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected
information resulted in waiver.198 However, courts should be careful not
to let “fairness concerns” trump their evaluation of the reasonableness of
the producing party’s pre-disclosure precautions. If a court were to
determine that the producing party truly had failed to exercise reasonable
pre-production steps to avoid disclosure of privileged or protected
information, but that a finding of waiver would result in some unfairness
to the producing party, it is questionable whether a ruling that there was no
waiver would be in accordance with the intent of Rule 502. This is

results superior to those of exhaustive manual review, as measured by recall and
precision”); George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal
System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 36–46, 66 (2007) http://law.richmond.edu/
jolt/v13i3/article10.pdf (stating that “the assumption on the part of lawyers that any form
of present-day search methodology will fully find ‘all’ or ‘nearly all’ available documents
in a large, heterogeneous collection of data is wrong in the extreme,” and noting that in
“[a] leading study by Blair & Maron, . . . the legal teams [employing a manual document
review] only found 20% of the responsive documents in a large subway crash case”).
Paul and Baron also encouraged the use of electronic screening methods and stated that
“whatever may be the limits of machine or artificial intelligence, in the near term future
lawyers must not be afraid to embrace creative, technological approaches to grappling
with the problem of knowledge management.” Paul and Baron, supra at 66.
195

See Grossman, supra note 194; Paul & Baron, supra note 194.
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FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.
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See id.
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Id.
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because the rule itself speaks in terms of reasonableness of the precautions
taken and not the fairness of the consequences for failing to do so.
[52] Interestingly, the very first case to interpret Rule 502 after its
enactment, Rhoads Industries, Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of
America, did exactly that.199 The court found that, “although [the plaintiff]
took steps to prevent disclosure and to rectify the error, its efforts were, to
some extent, not reasonable.”200 Applying the five-factor balancing test,
the court found that the first four factors, which relate to reasonableness,
“reviewed in the context of the evidence . . . favor[ed] Defendants.”201
However, the court based its ultimate conclusion on its finding that “the
fifth factor, the interest of justice, strongly favor[ed]” the plaintiff because
“[l]oss of the attorney–client privilege in a high-stakes, hard-fought
litigation is a severe sanction and can lead to serious prejudice.”202
[53] The court concluded that the plaintiff did not waive the privilege
for the hundreds of documents it inadvertently produced to the
defendants.203 The result was in accordance with pre-502 case law, but
appears to be at odds with Congressional intent, as expressed in Rule
502(b) itself, which speaks only to “reasonableness” and not “fairness.”204
A determination that a party waived the attorney–client privilege or workproduct protection always involves an element of unfairness and prejudice,
but that does not produce a result that is contrary to the interest of justice.
It is not unjust to find a waiver of privilege or protection when a party has
failed to exercise reasonable steps to preserve it. Excusing a failure to

199

254 F.R.D. 216, 222, 226 (E.D. Pa. 2008).

200

Id. at 226.

201

Id.

202

Id. at 227.

203

Id.

204

FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
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exercise reasonable measures to protect against disclosure solely based on
unfairness interferes with the practice of the rule in the manner intended.205
C. Rule 502(b)(3): Prompt and Reasonable Post-Production
Steps to Rectify Inadvertent Production
[54] Rule 502(b)(2) requires that a party take reasonable pre-production
steps to avoid inadvertent production of privileged or protected
information. Adding on to the 502(b)(2) requirement, Rule 502(b)(3)
requires that the holder of the privilege or protection “promptly [take]
reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).”206 Thus, both preproduction and post-production measures must be reasonable in order to
insulate inadvertent production from a finding of waiver.207 Two
important observations may be made regarding Rule 502(b)(3): it does not
require post-production review until a party has notice of possible
inadvertent production;208 and it references compliance with Federal Rule

205

See Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 655 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[The Rhoads court]
has applied FRE 502(b) in a rather peculiar fashion, choosing to adopt the factors
articulated in the committee’s note as a wholesale test of inadvertent disclosure.
Strangely, using only the [pre-502 case law] factors to determine the waiver question
eliminates any need to consult the elements required under FRE 502. Such an approach
would ignore a Congressional mandate and substitute judicial holdings for legislation.
Therefore, this Court concludes that a better approach focuses on the elements required
by FRE 502 and uses the [pre-502] factors, where appropriate, to supplement this
analysis.”); see also Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 429 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding
that plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that his attorney reviewed documents to screen for
privileged or protected communications were not specific enough to demonstrate
compliance with Rule 502(b)(2); and finding waiver, despite possible unfairness to
plaintiff, noting that “[t]he interests of fairness and justice would not be served by
relieving plaintiff of the consequences of counsel’s error . . . . Parties must recognize that
there are potentially harmful consequences if they do not take minimal precautions to
prevent against disclosure of privileged documents”).
206

FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).

207

Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.

208

FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.
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of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) as a means of reasonable post-production
remediation, when applicable.209
[55] With regard to the first observation, the Advisory Committee’s
Note states that, although a party must initiate prompt, reasonable postproduction steps to rectify its inadvertent production of privileged or
protected information, “[t]he rule does not require the producing party to
engage in a post-production review to determine whether any protected
communication or information has been produced by mistake.”210
However, “the rule does require the producing party to follow up on any
obvious indications that a protected communication or information has
been produced inadvertently.”211 Thus, the producing party is spared from
having to undertake its own review until it becomes aware of
circumstances that put it on notice that privileged or protected information
may have been produced inadvertently.
[56] But, once such notice has been provided, any unreasonable delay
in initiating reasonable steps to rectify the error will result in a
determination of waiver.212 Courts that have faced the duty of interpreting
Rule 502(b)(3) have underscored the fact that the crucial determination is
not how long it took to discover the inadvertent production, but rather,
how quickly the producing party reacted once discovery occurred.213
209

See FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).

210

FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.

211

Id.

212

See, e.g., Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009
WL 4949959, at *12 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (holding that the defendants could not use
Rule 502(b) because they did not take reasonable steps to rectify the inadvertent
disclosure that had occurred four days previously).
213

See, e.g., Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[T]hat Rule 502 does not require a post-production review supports
[the] view that the relevant time under subpart (b)(3) is how long it took the producing
party to act after it learned that the privileged or protected document had been
produced.”); Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 429 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Although
plaintiff did not alert defendants until months after his documents were produced when
he was preparing for deposition, plaintiff brought the error to defendants’ attention within
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Similarly, reviewing courts to date have rendered common-sense decisions
regarding issues of whether a party’s post-production efforts to remedy an
inadvertent production of privileged or protected information were
sufficiently prompt and reasonable.214
[57] An example is Coburn Group, in which defendant’s counsel
discovered the inadvertent production of privileged or protected
information, including an e-mail, four months after production when
a week or two of his discovery. Plaintiff was not required to ‘engage in a post-production
review to determine whether any protected communication or information [was] . . .
produced by mistake.’”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); Heriot v. Byrne, 257
F.R.D. 645, 662 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[H]ow the disclosing party discovers and rectifies the
disclosure is more important than when after the inadvertent disclosure the discovery
occurs.”).
214

See, e.g., Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, at *12 (finding a failure to comply with Rule
502(b)(3), which resulted in a waiver, because defendant discovered mistaken production
of work-product document four days after it was produced, but never asserted the
existence of work–product protection or requested that plaintiff return it, and stating that
it was “irrefutable that while the defendants took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure of
the document in the first instance, Defendants utterly failed to continue to reasonably
protect the document and failed again to take reasonable steps to rectify the erroneous
disclosure which had taken place only four days previously”); Multiquip, Inc. v. Water
Mgmt. Sys. LLC, No. CV 08-403-S-EJL-REB, 2009 WL 4261214, at *5 (D. Idaho Nov.
23, 2009) (noting that defendant’s counsel asserted privilege and requested return of
inadvertently-produced privileged documents on the same day, and nearly within the
hour, of discovery of their production, and again the next day, and finding that the
“relative contemporaneousness” of the remedial action met the requirements of Rule
502(b)(3) reasonableness, and hence, there was no waiver); Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v.
United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 511 (2009) (holding that defendant “waived the workproduct protection” for documents used during depositions because defendant did not
object during the depositions, did not seek to invoke the protections of Rule 26(b)(5)(B),
did not seek a protective order, and “Defendant’s complete failure to take curative action
[was] the antithesis of prompt rectification”); Peterson, 262 F.R.D. at 429 (noting that
plaintiff’s attorney did not discover inadvertent production of privileged documents until
months after they had been produced, but brought this to the attention of Defendant’s
attorney within a “week or two,” and finding that this factor was “neutral” under Rule
502(b)(3) and did not of itself warrant a finding of waiver, but ultimately finding waiver
because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a privilege applied or that reasonable preproduction steps were taken as required by Rule 502(b)(2)); Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 662
(holding that notification within twenty-four hours of discovering the error was
reasonable under 502(b)(3)).
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plaintiff’s counsel asked questions about the e-mail during a deposition.215
Defendant’s counsel objected during the deposition and, during another
deposition the next day and again two days later, asserted that the e-mail
was both privileged and protected, asking for its return.216 Plaintiff’s
attorney refused to return either the e-mail or other documents that
defendant claimed had been inadvertently produced, but agreed to
“quarantine” them.217 Defendant’s counsel agreed to allow plaintiff’s
counsel time to research the issue of waiver by production, and plaintiff’s
counsel agreed not to raise any delay by defendant in filing a motion to
compel return of the documents.218
[58] Counsel agreed to a briefing schedule, and the motion was filed
five weeks after plaintiff’s final refusal to return the documents.219 Noting
that Rule 502(b)(3) does not require the producing party to conduct postproduction review, the court held that there was no waiver because the
defendant acted with reasonable promptness in objecting after the
discovery of the inadvertent production, and the delay in filing the motion
was not unreasonable.220 The court reasoned that “the facts . . . show that
counsel for both sides acted reasonably and civilly in dealing with the
disputed documents and the associated deposition transcripts.”221 It
observed that “the facts and law surrounding the documents . . . turned out
to have some complexity,” and concluded: “In light of the fact that
[defendant] accommodated [plaintiff’s] counsel’s request for additional
time to formulate [plaintiff’s] position, and that [plaintiff] agreed to

215

Coburn Grp., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1040–41.

216

Id. at 1041.

217

Id.

218

Id.

219

Id. at 1040.

220

Coburn Grp., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.

221

Id.
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‘quarantine’ the documents until the dispute was resolved, the time
[defendant] took to file the actual motion was not unreasonable.”222
[59] In United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., the court rendered another
common-sense review of a party’s post-production efforts to remedy an
inadvertent production.223 In Sensient, the plaintiff produced 45,000
documents to the defendant on six different days between May 2008 and
February 2009.224 On August 29, 2008, the defendant returned to plaintiff
eighty-one potentially-privileged documents, and on September 10, 2008,
the plaintiff informed the defendant that all but one of returned documents
were privileged and had been produced inadvertently.225 Thereafter, from
November 21, 2008 through August 2009, the plaintiff identified other
documents as privileged, inadvertently produced on five different dates,
but it did not complete its privilege “re-review” until August 2009.226 The
plaintiff argued that the parties’ joint proposed discovery plan precluded
any finding of waiver, but the court summarily rejected the argument
because the plan made no mention of the parties exempting themselves
from the provisions of Rule 502(b).227
[60] As to the documents identified on September 10, 2008, the court
found that all three elements of Rule 502(b) had been met and that there
was no waiver.228 As for those documents identified on November 21,
2008, the court found that the plaintiff had waived privilege because the
plaintiff did not attempt to confirm its inadvertent disclosure until three

222

Id.

223

No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009).

224

Id. at *1.

225

Id.

226

Id.

227

Id. at *2. See infra Part VIII for a further discussion of this aspect of the court’s
opinion.
228

Sensient, 2009 WL 2905474, at *4–5.
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months after receiving notice from the defendant that privileged materials
had been disclosed.229 Also, the plaintiff did not complete its privilege
“re-review” until nearly seven months after the confirmation.230 The court
found both of these actions were unreasonable under Rule 502(b)(3).231
Similarly, the court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate Rule
502(b)(3) post-production reasonableness as to the documents identified as
inadvertently produced after June 2009 because the plaintiff waited nearly
ten months to confirm its error.232 Accordingly, the court found waiver as
to those documents as well.233
[61] The second observation, as noted, is that Rule 502(b)(3)
specifically identifies compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B), if applicable, as an example of reasonable post-production
remedial action.234 Rule 26(b)(5)(B), added as part of the 2006 ESI
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Information Produced. If information is produced in
discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of
protection as trial-preparation material, the party making
the claim may notify any party that received the
information of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy
the specified information and any copies it has and may not
use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved.
A receiving party may promptly present the information to

229

Id. at *5.

230

Id. at *5 n.13.

231

Id. at *6.

232

Id. at *7.

233

Sensient, 2009 WL 2905474, at *7.

234

FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (“[Disclosure does not operate as a waiver if] the holder
promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).”).
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the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the
receiving party disclosed the information before being
notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The
producing party must preserve the information until the
claim is resolved.235
The rule was added to address the increasingly difficult task of screening
voluminous ESI for privileged or protected information before producing
it in response to a discovery request.236 It was intended “to provide a
procedure for a party to assert a claim of privilege or trial-preparation
material protection after information is produced in discovery in the
action, and if the claim is contested, permit any party that received the
information to present the matter to the court for resolution.”237
Importantly, adding Rule 26(b)(5)(B) to the civil procedure rules merely
provided a process to resolve post-production claims of privilege or workproduct protection.238 It did not address the substantive issue of whether
asserting such a claim after having disclosed privileged or protected
information constituted a waiver;239 it took enactment of Rule 502(b) to
accomplish that.240
[62] Because Rule 502(b)(3) specifies that compliance with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), if applicable, is an illustration of how
a party may demonstrate post-production reasonableness following
inadvertent production of privileged or protected information, courts and
parties should be familiar with just how Rule 26(b)(5)(B) was intended to

235

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

236

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note.

237

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note.
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Id.

239

Id. (“Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not address whether the privilege or protection that is
asserted after production was waived by the production.”).
240

See FED. R. EVID. 502; see also Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 233 (D.
Md. 2005).
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operate. The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides
the following guidance:
A party asserting a claim of privilege or protection
after production must give notice to the receiving party.
That notice should be in writing unless the circumstances
preclude it. Such circumstances could include the assertion
of the claim during a deposition. The notice should be as
specific as possible in identifying the information and
stating the basis for the claim. Because the receiving party
must decide whether to challenge the claim and may
sequester the information and submit it to the court for a
ruling on whether the claimed privilege or protection
applies and whether it has been waived, the notice should
be sufficiently detailed so as to enable the receiving party
and the court to understand the basis for the claim and to
determine whether waiver has occurred. . . .
After receiving notice, each party that received the
information must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
information and any copies it has.
The option of
sequestering or destroying the information is included in
part because the receiving party may have incorporated the
information in protected trial-preparation materials. No
receiving party may use or disclose the information
pending resolution of the privilege claim. The receiving
party may present to the court the questions whether the
information is privileged or protected as trial-preparation
material, and whether the privilege or protection has been
waived. If it does so, it must provide the court with the
grounds for the privilege or protection specified in the
producing party’s notice, and serve all parties.
In
presenting the question, the party may use the content of
the information only to the extent permitted by the
applicable law of privilege, protection for trial-preparation
material, and professional responsibility.
If a party disclosed the information to nonparties
before receiving notice of a claim of privilege or protection
as trial-preparation material, it must take reasonable steps
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to retrieve the information and to return it, sequester it until
the claim is resolved, or destroy it.241
[63] In addition to suggesting steps that parties should use when
invoking Rule 26(b)(5)(B), the Advisory Committee’s Note emphasizes
that that rule “works in tandem with Rule 26(f).”242 It explains that Rule
26(f) was “amended to direct the parties to discuss privilege issues in
preparing their discovery plan,” and with amended Rule 16(b), Rule 26(f)
“allows the parties to ask the court to include in an order any agreements
the parties reach regarding issues of privilege or trial-preparation material
protection.”243 Further the Advisory Committee’s Note acknowledges
that, “[a]greements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders including such
agreements entered under Rule 16(b)(6) may be considered when a court
determines whether a waiver has occurred. Such agreements and orders
ordinarily control if they adopt procedures different from those in Rule
26(b)(5)(B).”244
[64] It will come as no surprise that Rule 502 itself has a provision Rule 502(e) - that recognizes that the parties themselves may negotiate to
reach agreements as to how to protect against waiver of privilege and
protection, including alternative post-production steps to those identified
in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).245 Pursuant to Rule 502(d)–(e), the court itself may
be called upon to approve such agreements and to incorporate them into a
court order, as well as to interpret them in the event of a dispute regarding
whether inadvertent disclosure should result in a waiver.246 Thus, an
agreement to circumvent waiver of privilege or protection may be reached

241

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id.

245

See FED. R. EVID. 502(e).

246

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e).
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pursuant to Rule 26(b)(5)(B), via Rules 16(b) and 26(f), or Rule 502(d) or
(e).
V. RULE 502(c)
[65] Rule 502 includes a conflict of laws provision aimed at simplifying
situations in which a disclosure of privileged or protected information has
been made in a state court proceeding, the disclosed information is offered
in a subsequent federal proceeding, and the federal and state laws
concerning waiver conflict. Rule 502(c) states:
When the disclosure is made in a State proceeding and is
not the subject of a State-court order concerning waiver, the
disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal
proceeding if the disclosure:
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had
been made in a Federal proceeding; or
(2) is not a waiver under the law of the State where
the disclosure occurred.247
[66] To date, no court has interpreted this section, but the Advisory
Committee’s Note is instructive. The Committee’s Note explains “that the
proper solution for the federal court is to apply the law that is most
protective of privilege and work product.”248 Thus, Rule 502(c) protects
the privileged or work product protected information if the disclosure
would not have been a waiver under either federal law or state law.249 One
rationale for applying the most protective law is that “[i]f the state law is
more protective . . . , the holder of the privilege or protection may well
have relied on that law when making the disclosure in the state
proceeding.”250 Additionally, applying the federal law when it is more

247

FED. R. EVID. 502(c).

248

FED. R. EVID. 502(c) advisory committee’s note.

249

See id.

250

Id.
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protective advances the federal objective of reducing or limiting
production costs in discovery.251 Rule 502(c) does not attempt to alter the
current statutory law or the principles of federalism and comity concerning
the enforceability of a state court confidentiality order in a federal
proceeding.252 Therefore, “a state court order finding no waiver in
connection with a disclosure made in a state court proceeding is
enforceable under existing law in subsequent federal proceedings.”253
VI. RULE 502(d)
[67] Rule 502(d) allows federal courts to limit the circumstances in
which production of privileged or protected information constitutes
waiver.254 In this way, section (d) enables the courts to advance the goals
of Rule 502–reduction of the expense of pre-production review for
privileged and protected information and predictable, uniform standards
concerning waiver of privilege or protection–through court orders.255 Rule
502(d) states:
A Federal court may order that the privilege or protection is
not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation
pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is
also not a waiver in any other Federal or State
proceeding.256

251

See id.

252

Id.

253

FED. R. EVID. 502(c) advisory committee’s note.

254

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee's note (“Under [Rule 502](d), a federal
court may order that disclosure of privileged or protected information ‘in connection
with’ a federal proceeding does not result in waiver.”).
255

Prior to the enactment of Rule 502, whether a confidentiality order entered in one case
was enforceable in other proceedings was subject to dispute. See Hopson v. Mayor of
Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 n.10 (D. Md. 2005) (discussing the variations in judicial
treatment of this topic).
256

FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
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Thus, courts may allow the parties to engage in discovery without risking
waiver of privilege or protection in the case at bar or any other federal or
state proceeding.257
[68] In Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, the court correctly exercised
the powers set forth in Rule 502(d).258 In that case, McGuire Woods
moved to add a claw-back provision to a protective order the court
issued.259 The plaintiff opposed the addition of such a provision.260
Observing that “the Rule ‘contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and
‘quick peek’ arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive costs of preproduction review for privilege and work product,’”261 McGuire Woods
argued the claw-back provision was necessary to “prevent contentious,
costly, and time consuming discovery disputes.”262 McGuire Woods
explained that it already “reviewed more than 13,750 documents
consisting of approximately 108,000 pages and that it plan[ned] to review
and possibly produce many more documents.”263 Also, it estimated that it
would need to review “at a minimum, . . . between 15,000 and 18,400 emails (sic) messages, comprised of an unknown number of pages.”264
Lastly, McGuire Woods argued that, because of the large number of
clients to which the firm owed a duty to protect attorney–client

257

See id.

258

No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010).

259

Id. at *2.

260

The court had issued the protective order in response to the parties’ cross-motions for
protective orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), after the parties had been unable to
agree to terms for a protective order. Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *1.
261

Id. at *2 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

262

Id.

263

Id.

264

Id.
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communications, the additional protections of a claw-back provision were
warranted.265
[69] In response, the plaintiff argued that the claw-back provision was
unnecessary because “[Rule] 502(b) now sets forth a uniform standard to
determine whether an asserted inadvertent disclosure results in a privilege
waiver, including whether the privilege holder took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure of the privilege material.”266 In the plaintiff’s view, the
provision would make the plaintiff responsible for McGuire Woods’
privilege review and require the plaintiff to “proceed with depositions and
motion practice with the ever-present concern that any document could
suddenly be taken back by McGuire Woods.”267 As discussed below, this
argument completely ignores the purpose and intent of Rule 502.
[70] Preliminarily, the Rajala court considered whether it had the
authority to issue an order with a claw-back provision, without party
agreement.268 The court concluded that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)(1), it did have such authority, reasoning that Rule
26(c)(1)(B) provides that “[a] [c]ourt may, ‘for good cause, issue an order
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense,’269 . . . . ‘specifying terms, including time and

265

Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *2.

266

Id. at *3.

267

Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).

268

Id. at *5. It is important to note that while Rule 502 expressly states that the “court
may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the
litigation pending before the court,” it is an evidentiary rule, not a procedural rule. FED.
R. EVID. 502(d). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c), 26(b)(2)(C), and 16(b),
however, provide ample authority in a civil case for a court to issue an order that provides
the protections stated in Rule 502(d). See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b); FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
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Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *5 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)).
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place, for the disclosure or discovery.’”270 The court also relied on the
Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), which
provides that, “[u]nder the rule, a confidentiality order is enforceable
whether or not it memorializes an agreement among the parties to the
litigation. Party agreement should not be a condition of enforceability of a
federal court’s order.”271 The court further observed that the 2006
Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f)
specifically contemplates claw-back agreements “as a way to reduce
discovery costs and minimize the risk of privilege waiver,” and that Rule
502 “validates . . . clawback provisions or agreements” that “‘provide for
the return of [privileged or protected] documents without waiver
irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party . . . .’”272 Thus, the
court concluded, “a court may fashion an order, upon a party’s motion or
its own motion, to limit the effect of waiver when a party inadvertently
discloses attorney-client privileged information or work product
materials.”273 Ultimately, because it found that McGuire Woods had
shown good cause for adding a claw-back agreement to the protective
order, the court granted McGuire Woods’ motion.274
[71] The court in Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil &
Gas Corp. also recognized the importance of Rule 502(d).275 There, the
defendant, concerned that a majority of the documents subject to
mandatory disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) were protected by the attorney–
client privilege and that disclosure of the documents would waive the

270

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B)). The court, however, cannot compel the
parties to disclose privileged material under Rule 26(c)(1); it may only limit the effect on
waiver of such a disclosure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B).
271

Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s
note).
272

Id. at *3–4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note).
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Id. at *4.

274

Id. at *6.
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No. 4:08-CV-684-Y, 2009 WL 464989 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009).

58

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

privilege in a separate proceeding, moved for a protective order to prevent
the disclosure of those materials.276 Quoting Rule 502(d), the plaintiff
argued that the court could ‘“order that the privilege or protection [would
not be] waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before
the court–in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other
Federal or State proceeding.’”277 The defendant incorrectly argued that the
court only could issue such an order with regard to inadvertent
disclosures.278 The court clarified that court orders pursuant to Rule
502(d) could encompass intentional, as well as inadvertent, disclosures,
and held that it had the authority “to order discovery to proceed and that
by complying with such an order [compelling discovery, the defendant]
ha[d] not waived the attorney-client or work-product privilege in the
[other] suit.”279
[72] In Rajala and Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, the courts did
not have to address whether they had authority on their own to enter an
order limiting the waiver of privilege or protection sua sponte.280 Clearly,
the rule contemplates a court’s power to issue such an order. The
Statement of Congressional Intent for Rule 502(d) provides:
This subdivision is designed to enable a court to enter an
order, whether on motion of one or more parties or on its
own motion, that will allow the parties to conduct and
respond to discovery expeditiously, without the need for

276

Id. at *1-2.

277

Id. at *4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d)).
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Id.

279

Id.; see also Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL
5070465, at *4–6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008) (relying on Rule 502(d) and a previously–
issued protective order that included a provision expressly addressing the effect of an
inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents to determine if a party had waived
privilege).
280

Ralaja, 2010 WL 2949582, at *8 & n.47; Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, 2009
WL 464989, at *5-8.
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exhaustive pre–production privilege reviews, while still
preserving each party’s right to assert the privilege to
preclude use in litigation of information disclosed in such
discovery.281
Because the Rules Enabling Act required Congressional approval to give
“force or effect” to this rule, the Statement of Congressional Intent is
afforded significant weight. 282
[73] Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3), a
court may include any such claw-back provision in its scheduling order.283
Should a court conclude that an order limiting the effect on waiver of a
disclosure of privileged or protected material is proper after the initial
scheduling order has been issued, the court may modify the scheduling
order for good cause pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(b)(4).284 The court also may issue an order limiting the effect on
waiver pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(i), which
states that a court may on its own motion, when required, issue an order
limiting the “frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these
rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the discovery sought . . . can
be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive.”285 Taken together, Federal Rule of
Evidence 502, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3) and (4), and
26(b)(2)(C), and the Statement of Congressional Intent provide sufficient

281

FED. R. EVID. 502(d) addendum to advisory committee’s note STATEMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT (emphasis added).
282

28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006).

283

See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3) (“The scheduling order must limit the time to . . .
complete discovery” and may “include other appropriate matters.”).
284

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4).

285

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
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authority for a court, on its own, to issue an order limiting the effect on
waiver of a disclosure of privilege or protected material.286
VII. RULE 502(e)
[74] Rule 502(e) allows parties to enter into agreements regarding the
effect of a disclosure (whether inadvertent or intentional) of privileged or
protected material.287 Moreover, this subdivision allows a court to
incorporate any such agreement into a court order and to give the
agreement the same effect as a court order issued under Rule 502(d).288
Rule 502(e) states: “An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a Federal
proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is
incorporated into a court order.”289 It “codifies the well-established
proposition that parties can enter an agreement to limit the effect of waiver
by disclosure between or among them.”290 Although “such an agreement
can bind only the parties to the agreement,” the rule provides a mechanism
for the court to incorporate the parties’ agreement into a court order,
which is the only way for the parties to obtain “protection against nonparties from a finding of waiver by disclosure.”291
[75] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3)(B)(iv) allows a court to
include in its scheduling order “any agreements the parties reach for
asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material
after information is produced.”292 Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

286

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)–
(4). See generally FED. R. EVID. 502(d) addendum to advisory committee’s note
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT.
287

FED. R. EVID. 502(e).

288

Id.

289

Id.

290

FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note.

291

Id.

292

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
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26(f)(3)(D) requires that the parties include in their discovery plan “any
issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material, including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these
claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their
agreement in an order.”293 Additionally, the 2006 Advisory Committee’s
Note to Rule 26(f)(3) specifically contemplates the type of claw-back
agreements that state, “production without intent to waive privilege or
protection should not be a waiver so long as the responding party
identifies the documents mistakenly produced, and that the documents
should be returned under those circumstances.”294 Rule 502 also goes
hand-in-glove with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), which
provides:
If information is produced in discovery is subject to a claim
of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material,
the party making the claim may notify any party that
received the information of the claim and the basis for it.
After being notified, a party must promptly return,
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any
copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until
the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve
the information if the party disclosed it before being
notified; and may promptly present the information to the
court under seal for a determination of the claim. The
producing party must preserve the information until the
claim is resolved.295
[76] Notably, nothing in the text of either Rule 502(e) or Rule 16(b) or
26(f) requires parties to undertake “reasonable” precautions to avoid
disclosure of privileged or protected information as part of a claw-back,
quick peek or other non-waiver agreement.296 To the contrary, these rules
293

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D).

294

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note.

295

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

296

See FED. R. EVID. 502(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
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would permit the parties to agree that discovery material could be
produced without any pre-production screening at all, but be “clawed”
back upon demand after production.297 In this regard, the court in Rajala
correctly pointed out that the agreement of the parties may contain a
provision that allows for the return of a privileged or protected document
“‘irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party.’”298 However, as
will be discussed in the next section, some courts have failed to enforce
non-waiver agreements that parties have reached, because the producing
party failed to take reasonable pre-production measures to avoid
disclosure of privileged or protected information. These decisions fail to
interpret Rule 502 correctly.
VIII. THE VULNERABILITY TO DATE OF RULE 502(d) AND (e)
AND 26(b)(5)(B) AGREEMENTS TO RULE 502(b)(2)
AND (3)’S REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
[77] Although Rule 502(d) and (e) and the accompanying Advisory
Committee’s Note appear straightforward, some courts have engrafted
onto them a “reasonableness” test that clearly is not contemplated by the
rule itself.299 In fact, the Committee’s Note states the exact opposite with
regard to Rule 502(d): “[T]he court order may provide for the return of
documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing
party.”300 Similarly, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) (via Rules 16(b) and
26(f)), parties may ask the court to include in a court order any agreement
they reach pertaining to waiver of privileged or protected information, and
the parties’ agreements and the related court orders “ordinarily control if
they adopt procedures different from those in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).”301
297

See generally FED. R. EVID. 502(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); FED.
R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note.
298

Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *4 (D.
Kan. July 22, 2010) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note).
299

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e); see also FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e) advisory committee’s
note.
300

FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).

301

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note.
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[78] Yet, some courts have displayed a misguided reluctance to accept
that parties may agree to procedures that would not be deemed reasonable
under Rule 502(b)(2) or (3). For example, in Spieker v. Quest Cherokee,
LLC, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant could
avoid an estimated $250,000 in pre-production review costs by entering
into an agreement under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) and
502 in which the defendant would not have to conduct such a review, but
rather could produce the documents subject to the right to assert privilege
thereafter.302 The court stated:
The difficulty with this argument is that Rule 502(b)
preserves the privilege if “the holder of the privilege or
protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” of
the privileged material. Simply turning over all ESI
materials does not show that a party has taken “the
reasonable steps” to prevent disclosure of its privileged
materials and plaintiffs’ proposal is flawed.303
[79] The court’s comments failed to account for the Advisory
Committee’s Notes to Rules 502 and 26(b)(5)(B), and, more importantly,
entirely ignored Rule 502(d) and (e), which would permit the parties to do
exactly what was proposed, and which encourage the court to approve it.
Rulings such as that rendered in Spieker fly in the face of the clear intent
of Rule 502 and ignore the rule’s explicit provisions. Contrary to such
rulings, parties should be permitted the flexibility to enter into non-waiver
agreements that permit less than full compliance with Rule 502(b)(2) preproduction review.
This freedom would allow parties to avoid
disproportionate discovery costs occasioned by comprehensive preproduction review for privilege or work-product protection.
[80] Luna Gaming-San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP is an
example of a case in which the court declined to enforce the parties’ non-

302

Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3 (D.
Kan. July 21, 2009).
303

Id. (footnote omitted).
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waiver agreement.304 The parties entered into a protective order approved
by a magistrate judge, which outlined the procedures they would follow to
resolve any disputes relating to allegations of inadvertently produced
privileged documents.305
During discovery, the plaintiff produced
privileged documents, which the defendant’s counsel used during a
deposition, without objection by the plaintiff’s counsel.306 Several months
later, during another deposition, the defendant’s counsel used as an exhibit
another privileged document that the plaintiff had produced, at which time
the plaintiff’s counsel objected and invoked the “claw-back” provision of
the protective order.307 Defendant’s counsel objected, arguing that the use
of privileged documents during a deposition several months earlier,
without objection by the plaintiff’s attorney, waived any privilege
claims.308 Thereafter, the defendant’s attorney continued to question the
deponent about the document, without objection by the plaintiff’s
counsel.309 However, the next day, when defense counsel again attempted
to use the privileged document as a deposition exhibit, plaintiff’s counsel
objected and once again invoked the claw-back provision in the protective
order.310 Defendant did not use privileged documents any more during
discovery, and counsel did not discuss further the return of any asserted
privileged documents to the plaintiff.311 The defendant subsequently filed
two motions for summary judgment and included privileged documents as
exhibits in support of the motions, and the plaintiff did not object.312
304

No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).
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Id. at *1.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.

309

Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC, 2010 WL 275083, at *1.
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Id. at *2.
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Id.

312

Id.
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[81] Ultimately, a dispute arose about whether the plaintiff had waived
its claims of privilege regarding the documents that defendant used as its
summary judgment exhibits.313 The magistrate judge held that the
privileged documents had been produced inadvertently, and the plaintiff
had not waived its privilege.314 The magistrate judge agreed with the
defendant that the plaintiff should have objected earlier, but said that once
the plaintiff eventually objected, the defendant was obligated under the
protective agreement to return the documents immediately, and its failure
to do so violated the protective order.315 Additionally, while finding both
plaintiff and defendant culpable, the magistrate judge viewed the
defendant as more culpable, because the protective order required the
defendant to seek a judicial resolution of the waiver issue before using the
disputed documents as summary judgment exhibits.316
[82] When the defendant objected to this ruling, the district judge
upheld a number of the magistrate judge’s rulings, but overruled the
magistrate judge’s ruling that plaintiff had not waived the privilege.317
The court based its ruling on Rule 502(b)(3), finding that the plaintiff had
failed to promptly initiate remedial action once it learned of the
inadvertent production of privileged materials, despite the fact that the
parties had entered into a protective order, signed by the magistrate judge,
that permitted the plaintiff to claw-back any inadvertently produced
privileged documents.318 The court held the plaintiff’s privilege waived as
the language of the protective order did not specify how or when a party
was required to exercise the claw-back provision after finding that
privileged documents inadvertently had been produced, and stated:

313
314

Id.
Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC, 2010 WL 275083, at *2.

315

Id.

316

Id.

317

Id. at *4, 7.
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Id. at *6–7.
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Although the Protective Order states that the inadvertent
disclosure of privileged documents “shall not constitute a
waiver of any privilege,” it does not address under what
circumstances failure to object to the use of inadvertently
produced privileged documents waives the privilege . . . .
Furthermore, even if the Protective Order’s provisions did
apply to this dispute, [the plaintiff’s] repeated failures to
object to the use of the Privileged Documents . . . waived
any protections it could have invoked under the Protective
Order.319
[83] This is a sobering lesson for litigants who wish to take advantage
of Rule 502(e) and enter into binding non-waiver agreements with their
opposing counsel: while they may do so, they must exercise great care in
drafting such agreements. If a non-waiver agreement is ambiguous, as in
Luna Gaming, the court may take a formalist view and resort to analysis
under Rule 502 if the agreement does not explicitly govern resolution of
the dispute.320 In Luna Gaming, the parties clearly intended to allow postproduction assertion of a privilege through the claw-back provision.321
However, because the protective order did not particularize that procedure,
the court analyzed the issue under Rule 502(b)(3).322 Thus, the court
found waiver and held that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule
502(b)(3) because the plaintiff repeatedly failed to object or demand the
return of the inadvertently produced privileged documents.323
[84] The take-away point is crystal clear here. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) specifically contemplates that parties may negotiate
their own non-waiver agreements, and that these procedures are intended

319

Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC, 2010 WL 275083, at *4.

320

See id.
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See id. at *1.
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See id. at *4.
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See id. at *5–7.
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to control notwithstanding any inconsistency with procedures stated in the
rule.324 Similarly, Rule 502(d) clearly contemplates that when a court
issues an order — sua sponte, or at the joint request of the parties — to the
effect that certain disclosures of privileged or protected information do not
constitute a waiver, it can approve procedures that would not otherwise
pass muster under Rule 502(b)(2) or (3).325 Further, Rule 502(e) allows
the parties to enter into such an agreement to avoid waiver without court
approval.326
[85] Expressed differently, Rule 502(d) and (e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B)
are intended to operate in concert to permit parties to negotiate their own
non-waiver agreements under whatever terms they want, even if
inconsistent with Rule 26(b)(5)(B) or 502(b). Moreover, Rule 502(d) and

324

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides a procedure for presenting and addressing
[issues regarding post-production assertion of privilege or workproduct]. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works in tandem with Rule 26(f), which is
amended to direct the parties to discuss privilege issues in preparing
their discovery plan, and which, with amended Rule 16(b), allows the
parties to ask the court to include in an order any agreements the parties
reach regarding issues of privilege or trial-preparation material
protection. Agreements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders
including such agreements entered under Rule 16(b)(6) may be
considered when a court determines whether a waiver has occurred.
Such agreements and orders ordinarily control if they adopt
procedures different from those in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).
325

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d). “For example, the court order may provide for return of
documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party; the rule
contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’ arrangements as a way to
avoid the excessive costs of pre–production review for privilege and work product.”
FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added) (citing Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
326

See FED. R. EVID. 502(e); FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note
(“Subdivision (e) codifies the well-established proposition that parties can enter an
agreement to limit the effect of waiver by disclosure between or among them.”).
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(e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B) encourage courts to approve such agreements by
issuing a protective order if requested to do so, or on their own volition.
Thus, for example, it would be perfectly appropriate for the parties to a
lawsuit to enter into a non-waiver agreement that permitted the defendant
to produce all its documents to plaintiff without conducting any preproduction review for privilege or work product, in order to avoid the
expense of doing so, while reserving the right to “claw-back” at a later
time any privileged documents that were produced. This procedure would
never pass muster under Rule 502(b)(2), because it cannot seriously be
argued that doing no pre-production review at all meets the requirement of
Rule 502(b)(2) to take “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.”327
Nevertheless, if the parties negotiate such an agreement, as they are
permitted to do under Rule 502(d) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B) in order to avoid
the expense of reviewing voluminous ESI for privilege and work product,
while reserving the right to claw-back privileged or protected documents
after they have been produced, that agreement “trumps” any contrary
obligation that Rule 502 or 26(b)(5)(B) would impose in the absence of an
agreement.328
[86] What Luna Gaming, and the decisions discussed below, make
clear, however, is that courts asked to enforce non-waiver agreements
entered into by the parties may be reluctant, or even hostile, when asked to
construe the agreements beyond their specific language, and may be
inclined to construe any ambiguity against the drafters. In Luna Gaming,
the failure of the claw-back provision in the protective order to specify
how and when the party invoking that clause was obligated to do so
resulted in the court disregarding the agreement in favor of analysis under
Rule 502(b)(3), which resulted in a finding of waiver.329 One may argue
that it is more consistent with the underlying purpose of Rule 502 for a
reviewing court to construe broadly an ambiguous non-waiver agreement
and thereby further the litigants’ intent to reduce discovery costs and avoid
327

FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).

328

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.
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See Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804 BTM
(WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).
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waiver, but, to date, the courts addressing this issue have taken an
unfortunate and unnecessarily strict constructionist approach. Unless this
changes, parties will need to exercise extreme care in drafting such
agreements to ensure that they clearly address the process by which parties
may assert privileges under the agreement and avoid the control of Rule
502(b) or common law waiver doctrine.
[87] In Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Felman Production, Inc, the
parties’ claw-back agreement proved ineffective against waiver.330 The
parties entered into an “ESI Stipulation” governing discovery, which
contained a claw-back provision, but they did not submit it to the court for
approval or incorporation into a protective order.331 The claw-back
provision in the ESI Stipulation permitted a party to request return of any
inadvertently-produced privileged or protected information within ten
days of discovery of its production, after which, within five days, the
receiving party was obligated to return or destroy all copies, subject to the
ability of the receiving party to file a motion to compel.332 Interestingly,
the claw-back provided: “[c]ompliance by the producing party with the
steps required by this [agreement] shall be sufficient, notwithstanding any
argument by a party to the contrary, to satisfy the reasonableness
requirement of FRE 502(b)(3).”333 Thus, unlike the agreement in Luna
Gaming, the claw-back agreement in Mt. Hawley contained specific
deadlines in which the producing party was to give notice to the receiving
party of inadvertent production, and contemplated that the procedures in
the claw-back would trump any other inquiry under Rule 502(b)(2) or
(3).334 Pursuant to the claw-back agreement, the plaintiff demanded return
of an inadvertently produced privileged e-mail, but the defendant refused

330

See generally Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.W. Va.
2010).
331

Id. at 128–29.
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Id. at 129.
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and asserted that any privilege had been waived due to the plaintiff’s
failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure.335 The
defendant also argued that privilege was inapplicable by virtue of the
crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege.336
[88] The court ruled that the plaintiff had complied with the notice
requirements of the claw-back, thereby satisfying Rule 502(b)(3), and that
the defendant violated the claw-back by failing to return or destroy the email.337 Nevertheless, the court found that, despite the claw-back
provision that memorialized the parties’ agreement regarding Rule
502(b)(3) post-production responsibilities, the plaintiff failed to meet its
Rule 502(b)(2) obligation to take reasonable steps to avoid production of
the e-mail in the first place, and found waiver had occurred.338 Though it
is clear that the parties could have negotiated a non-waiver agreement
pursuant to Rule 502(e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B),339 allowing producing
parties to engage in no pre-production review at all and reserving the right
to claw-back privileged or protected information, the agreement was silent
as to any pre-production precautions that were to be taken.340 This led the
court to conclude that the claw-back agreement was inapplicable to preproduction obligations, and on that basis, it analyzed the plaintiff’s
conduct under Rule 502(b)(2)’s reasonableness standard.341 Thus, because
the non-waiver agreement that the parties negotiated did not specifically
335

Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 127.
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See id. at 133–36.
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See supra notes 324 and 325; see also Gilday v. Kenra, Ltd., No: 1:09-cv-00229TWP-TAB, 2010 WL 3928593, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2010) (“Rule 502 does not
apply if the parties have their own agreement regarding inadvertent disclosure of
privileged documents.”).
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address the pre-production obligations of producing parties, it was
ineffective despite its otherwise comprehensive provisions regarding postproduction obligations, and the court was unwilling to infer from the
totality of the claw-back provision an intent to alter Rule 502(b)(2) as well
as 502(b)(3).342
[89] Once again, the lesson for parties is clear. When drafting a nonwaiver agreement under Rule 502(e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B), painstaking
care should be taken to ensure that the agreement clearly addresses both
pre-production and post-production obligations. Otherwise the parties run
the risk that the court will make its waiver determinations in accordance
with Rule 502(b)(2) and (3) instead of the non-waiver agreement.
[90] The court in United States v. Sensient Colors took a similar
approach to the Mt. Hawley court.343 In Sensient Colors, the parties agreed
upon a joint discovery plan that contained the following paragraphs: III.A
“Non-waiver: By exchanging documents or information with each other,
the Parties do not waive any privilege, confidentiality or other protection
from production that otherwise applies to such documents or information,”
and VI. “The Parties agree that the inadvertent production of privileged
documents or information (including ESI) shall not, in and of itself, waive
any privilege that would otherwise attach to the document or information
produced.”344 The plaintiff argued that this language precluded a finding
that 214 inadvertently produced privileged documents constituted a
waiver.345 The court categorically dismissed this argument, stating:
This argument is rejected. Nowhere in the Discovery Plan
does it mention that the parties are excused form [sic] the
requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) . . . .

342

See id.

343

See United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474,
at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009).
344

Id. at *2 n.4.

345

See id. at *2.
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Plaintiff and Sensient are represented by sophisticated
counsel. If they intended to implement a “clawback”
provision this would have been specifically mentioned.346
While the court acknowledged that the parties could have negotiated a
claw-back agreement that would have undone an inadvertent production of
privileged information “irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing
party,”347 it observed that “[c]ourts generally frown upon . . . such blanket
[non-waiver agreements]” because they “essentially immuniz[e] attorneys
from negligent handling of documents,” and can lead to “sloppy attorney
review and improper disclosure which could jeopardize clients’ cases.”348
[91] Two observations flow from the court’s analysis. First, following
the enactment of Rule 502 and Rule 26(b)(5)(B), it no longer can be said
that “blanket” non-waiver agreements are “generally frown[ed] upon,”349
as the Advisory Committee’s Notes to each rule makes it clear that parties
may agree to procedures that are not consistent with those stated in the
rules.350 Importantly, with the additions of Rule 26(b)(5)(B) in 2006 and
Rule 502(d) and (e) in 2008, Congress intended specifically to change the
prior common law rules regarding privilege waiver by inadvertent

346

Id. (footnote omitted).

347

Id. at *2 n.6 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)).
348

Sensient Colors, Inc., 2009 WL 2905474, at *3.

349

Id.

350

See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“For example, the court order may
provide for return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the
disclosing party; [Rule 502] contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’
arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive costs of pre-production review for privilege
and work product.” (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s
note (“Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works in tandem with Rule 26(f) . . . which, with amended Rule
16(b), allows the parties to ask the court to include in an order any agreements the
parties reach regarding issues of privilege or trial-preparation material protection.
Agreements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders including such agreements entered
under Rule 16(b)(6) . . . . ordinarily control if they adopt procedures different from those
in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).”) (emphasis added).
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production of privileged or protected information. Congress recognized
that, especially with regard to ESI discovery, “litigation costs necessary to
protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have
become prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however
innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver . . . .”351 It is
fundamentally inconsistent with the intent of Rule 502 to conclude that
courts have an obligation to insist that parties undertake costly preproduction review for privilege or work product if they are amenable to an
agreement not to do so, subject to a claw-back agreement. Continuing to
do so would thwart the goals Congress intended to achieve by enacting
Rule 502.352
[92] Second, Sensient Colors again illustrates an instance in which a
court was unwilling to interpret a non-waiver agreement broadly, in
concert with the obvious intent of the parties, but rather chose to do so
narrowly.353 This further underscores the need for parties to exercise
extreme care in drafting non-waiver agreements to address specifically
both their pre- and post-production disclosure obligations in connection
with inadvertent production of privileged or protected information. As
litigants and courts gain more experience with Rule 502, it is hoped that
parties will exercise greater care in drafting non-waiver agreements and
courts will abandon any reluctance to interpret non-waiver agreements
broadly to fulfill their purpose. In the meantime, counsel drafting nonwaiver agreements pursuant to Rule 502(e) should consider the following
issues.

351

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

352

See id.

353

See Sensient Colors, Inc., 2009 WL 2905474, at *3; see also N. Am. Rescue Prods.,
Inc. v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL 1873291, at *9 (S.D. Ohio
May 10, 2010) (concluding that the “claw-back” or “no waiver” provisions of the
protective order that the parties entered into did not prevent a finding that inadvertent
production of privileged e-mails constituted waiver because the parties limited the
protective order’s scope to “Designated Materials” and the e-mails had not been so
designated).
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[93] First, when drafting a non-waiver agreement pursuant to Rule
502(e), counsel must determine whether they will ask the court to approve
it, pursuant to Rule 502(d). The primary advantage for doing so is that the
non-waiver agreement is then binding on third parties, in both state and
federal proceedings.354 A secondary advantage is that seeking court
approval provides the parties with an opportunity to make clear to the
court any unusual aspects of the agreement, such as a provision that the
producing party will not do any pre-production review for privilege or
work-product protection.355 That way, if the court has any concerns about
approving such a provision, the parties have an opportunity to remind the
court that the provision is perfectly appropriate, as noted in the Advisory
Committee’s Note to Rule 502(d).356 If the court agrees and approves the
provision, then the parties can feel secure in complying with it.357 If the
court refuses to approve the provision however, then the parties become
aware of this up front, and will have to undertake some measure of preproduction review for privilege or protection.358 When the court insists on
requiring such review, it would be both wise and appropriate to discuss in
advance what the court expects, and to explore whether measures such as
computer-based searching would be reasonable. If so, the parties should
make sure the court is aware of, and approves of, the methodology the
parties propose to use. This will help counsel eliminate the problems
experienced in Mt. Hawley359 and Spieker.360 Finally, even if the parties
intend to undertake extensive pre-production review for privilege or workproduct protection, and they do not foresee any possible waiver that could
be asserted by non-parties to the litigation, there is no disadvantage in
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See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.

355

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.

356

See id.

358

See id.

359

See generally Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.W. Va.
2010).
360

See generally Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892
(D. Kan. July 21, 2009).
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seeking and obtaining court approval of their non-waiver agreement, with
its concomitant protection against non-parties.
[94] Second, if parties intend to enter into a non-waiver agreement, they
cannot afford to allow the agreement to be ambiguous about whether the
parties will undertake pre-production review, and if so, what level of
review they will employ. Parties should keep in mind that they can agree
to forego pre-production review, subject to a claw-back agreement.361
However, parties should expressly state any such agreement and consider
including an explanation of why they have elected to forego preproduction review.
Prudent parties will cite the cost-benefit
proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and explain why, given what is
at issue in the case, foregoing pre-production review is appropriate under
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii) factors.362 This will help persuade a reviewing
court that the parties tailored the procedures they selected to fit the needs
of the particular case and in accord with Rule 26(b)(2)(C), rather than
acting sloppy or incautious, as was the court’s concern in Spieker.363
Similarly, if the parties intend to conduct pre-production review, they
should carefully consider what they intend to do. If the planned review is
less than an individual review of each document produced (especially if
the parties will employ computer-based search methodology), the parties
should state the parameters of the review explicitly and keep in mind some
of the concerns the Mt. Hawley court expressed.364 The parties should
either design their pre-production review to address those concerns, or

361

See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting
that many parties “enter into so-called ‘claw-back’ agreements that allow the parties to
forego privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to return inadvertently
produced privileged documents”).
362

See Bradley T. Tennis, Cost-Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 119 YALE L.J. 1113,
1115 (2010) (noting that the cost-benefit proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) were
implemented to limit discovery requests for ESI that is proven to be “‘not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B)).
363

See Spieker, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3 (explaining that defendant’s estimate for the
cost to conduct a “privilege and relevance” review was greatly exaggerated and flawed).
364

See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 136.
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state why they selected the methods they intend to employ, and why the
methods are appropriate.
[95] Parties should keep in mind that Rule 502(e) allows them to decide
for themselves what, if any, pre-production review measures they want to
undertake.365 Since Rule 502(e) does not require parties to meet Rule
502(b)(2) pre-production “reasonableness,” parties should be very
cautious when drafting their non-waiver agreement so they do not adopt
this standard themselves.366 The take-away point is that it is essential to
consider carefully what level of pre-production review, if any, the parties
agree to, and to ensure that this is clearly stated in the Rule 502(e) nonwaiver agreement.
[96] Third, parties should keep in mind that Rule 502(e) agreements
apply to preclude waiver for any disclosure, whether inadvertent or
purposeful.367 Accordingly, when drafting a non-waiver agreement,
counsel should be explicit in stating the scope of their non-waiver
agreement and make sure the scope matches the procedures they intend to
apply. For example, a claw-back agreement wherein a party intends to
produce documents without complete pre-production review contemplates
purposeful, not inadvertent, production. It would be a mistake to draft a
claw-back provision as part of a Rule 502(e) agreement that states that it is
intended to protect against “inadvertent” disclosure of privileged or
protected information. Parties would be wise to consider drafting their
non-waiver agreements to cover the broadest range of contingencies,
which would cover both inadvertent and purposeful disclosure of
privileged and work product protected information. Doing so will

365

FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note.

366

Compare FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (stating the
“reasonableness” factors that must be met for pre-production review), with FED. R. EVID.
502(e) advisory committee’s note (excluding any such “reasonableness” requirement).
367

See FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note (“The rule makes clear that if
parties want protection against non-parties from a finding of waiver by disclosure, the
agreement must be made part of a court order.”). The Rule does not limit the type of
disclosure that may be precluded. See id.
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eliminate the difficulty experienced by the parties in Sensient Colors,
where the agreement only afforded protection against inadvertent
production of privileged or protected information. 368
[97] Fourth, parties must keep in mind that Rule 502 affords protection
against waiver by disclosure of both attorney–client privileged and work
product protected information.369 When drafting such agreements, counsel
should state explicitly that it applies to both categories of protected
information.370
[98] Fifth, parties should exercise particular care in drafting non-waiver
agreement language that identifies what they must do, and when, upon
discovering that privileged or protected information has been produced,
whether inadvertently or intentionally. They would be wise to remember
that Rule 502(b)(3) imposes no post-production duty to review what has
been produced to discover if privileged or protected information has been
produced.371 If the rule itself does not do so, the parties should be
particularly wary of doing so themselves. Additionally, in drafting a nonwaiver agreement, parties should pay particular attention to whether they
should impose upon themselves a particular deadline within which they
must give the notice contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B) that they are invoking a post-production claim of privilege or
work-product protection.372 As noted above, a number of reviewing courts
have held that parties were not entitled to the protection of non-waiver

368

See United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474,
at *2 n.4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009).
369

FED. R. EVID. 502.

370

See eDIGital Newsletter – December 2010, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.seyfarth.com/ (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Newsletters”
hyperlink; then follow “eDIGital Newsletter – December 2010” hyperlink) (noting that
counsel should implement clear non-waiver language in confidentiality and protective
orders).
371

See FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).

372

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
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agreements they drafted because they failed to particularize what they
were to do, and when they were to do so, upon discovering that privileged
or protected information had been disclosed, or they failed to comply with
the procedures that had been drafted into the agreement.373
IX. CONCLUSION
[99] If it lives up to its purpose, Rule 502 should clarify and limit the
effect of disclosure of privileged or protected information and waiver of
the privilege or protection. Further, it should enable parties to reduce the
escalating costs associated with privilege and protection review by
permitting them to forego manual document review in favor of electronic
search and retrieval methods and/or non-waiver agreements that
themselves limit the effect of waiver. The framework exists for Rule 502
to function as intended, but thus far it has not fulfilled its purpose, mainly
because parties have overlooked it and courts have not construed it
consistently with its purpose—or consistently with each other—such that
counsel and litigants are left without the protections and uniform set of
standards that the rule should provide.374 To achieve Rule 502’s purpose,
courts should keep in mind the key points that this article attempts to
illuminate for interpreting the rule.
[100] First, “intentional waiver” under Rule 502(a) results from
production of information known to be privileged or protected that was
“voluntary” and not “inadvertent,” and, while the fairness provision found
in Rule 502(a)(3) generally provides greater protection for opinion work
product, it would be a mistake to categorically prohibit subject matter
373

See, e.g., Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804
BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (finding waiver because
waiving party did not take affirmative steps to retrieve the document in question);
Sensient Colors, 2009 WL 2905474, at *5–6 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a nonwaiver agreement protected against waiver regarding inadvertently produced privileged
documents, and finding waiver because the parties were sophisticated and had been
represented by counsel and the agreement merely protected against “inadvertent”
production of privileged or protected information without specifically stating that it
contained a “claw-back” provision).
374

See supra Part II.C.
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waiver of opinion work product on that basis if all the elements of Rule
502(a) are met.375 Second, reasonableness of pre-production procedures
should not be a consideration in determining whether production of
attorney–client privileged documents was inadvertent under Rule
502(b)(1). The more useful approach is to equate “inadvertence” under
Rule 502(b)(1) with “mistaken” or “unintentional” production. Of utmost
importance, Rule 502(b)(2) and (3), which require reasonableness, do not
demand perfection, and courts should take care not to require it.376 The
proportionality factors in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) also
are useful in assessing reasonableness under Rule 502(b)(2). Rule
502(b)(3) does not require post-production review until a party has notice
that it may have produced privileged or protected information
inadvertently.377
[101] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) outlines a means of
reasonable post-production remediation, and it is intended to work with
Rule 26(f), which directs parties to address privilege and protection issues
in their discovery plan and allows them to ask the court to include any
agreement they reach on those issues in a court order.378 The multi-factor
test from pre-502 case law for determining whether inadvertent production
of privileged or protected information constitutes waiver is informative
but not dispositive, and particular care should be exercised in evaluating
whether the “fairness” of a finding of waiver should militate in favor of a
ruling that no waiver occurred if the party that inadvertently produced
privileged or protected information failed to take reasonable pre- and postproduction actions.
[102] Third, pursuant to Rule 502(d), the court may issue an order—at
the parties’ behest or sua sponte—allowing the parties to engage in
discovery without worrying about the consequences of waiver of privilege

375
376

See supra Part III.
See supra notes 167 & 205 and accompanying text.

377

See FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).

378

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B), 26(f).
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or protection in the case before it or any other proceeding, and pursuant to
Rule 502(e), the parties may enter into an agreement limiting waiver in the
litigation between them and, if adopted as a court order under Rule 502(d),
in any other proceeding.379 Thus, under Rule 502(d) orders and 502(e)
agreements that provide otherwise, the parties need not take reasonable
precautions to avoid disclosure of privileged or protected information,
because the reasonableness requirements of Rule 502(b)(2) and (3) do not
apply to disclosures made pursuant to a Rule 502(d) order or Rule 502(e)
agreement.
[103] Finally, counsel and litigants should be mindful of court decisions
when crafting non-waiver agreements, so that the agreements do not fall
prey to interpretations contrary to the rule’s purpose. Explicit provisions,
which do not presuppose a court’s willingness to uphold or broadly
interpret the agreement, are essential. Keeping in mind that Rule 502(e)
agreements may preclude waiver for inadvertent and purposeful
disclosures of privileged and work-product protected information, parties
should state the broad application intended in the agreement explicitly. If
the parties elect to forego pre-production review, they should state so
expressly in their agreement, along with an explanation for their decision
that incorporates the cost-benefit proportionality factors of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C).380 If they agree to undertake pre-production review, they
should state the parameters of the review explicitly.
[104] Parties also should state explicitly what they must do, and when,
upon discovering that privileged or protected information has been
produced. They should consider whether they will seek court approval of
their agreement pursuant to Rule 502(d), and, if the court requires preproduction review, counsel should discuss the parameters of that review
with the court, including whether the court considers electronic search
methods reasonable. Following these steps should help counsel draft
agreements that effectively limit the effects of waiver. Moreover, if courts
interpret and implement Rule 502 and parties’ agreements in accord with
the principles identified above, they will help achieve the purpose of the
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See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e).
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See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
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rule by consistently limiting the effects of waiver and associated privilege
and production review costs.
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